Fire Services Review Special Committee

PHONE: B60-442-0353
wwwywaterforde tor
WATERFORD, CT 06385-2886
FIRE SERVICES REVIEW SPECIAL COMMITTEE
SPECIAL MEETING AGENDA
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 18,2025 6:00P.M. COHANZIE FIRE STATION (53 DAYTON RD)
1. Establishment of quorum; call to order
2. Public Comment
. Approval of minutes for May 1, 2025, meeting and May 29, 2025 meeting.
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4. Consideration and possible action on the RTM’s charge to the committee (RTC 6/7/21):
Review issues including performance, policies, and staffing and present their findings/recommendations
on any changes needed to enhance public safety, creating a steering document and strategic plan.
a. Review and discuss comments provided by Director Haley.
5. Discuss remaining committee meeting schedule.
6. Adjournment.
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encl: May 1, 2025 Minutes
May 29, 2025 Minutes
Comments on draft report-Williams
NIST Report on Residential Fire Response

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Fire Services Review Special Committee Minutes—Special Meeting May 1, 2025
Members Present: Robert Tuneski (Bo); Susan Driscoll (RTM); Tim Condon (RTM Public Protection & Safety Comm.);
Matthew Keatley (RTM); Richard Muckle (BoS); Todd Patton (Chief, Goshen Fire Ca.); Ronnie Williams (WFD)
Members Absent: Mike Howley (Interim Director, Fire Services); Steven Sinagra (Director, Emergency Management);
Mark Greczkowski (WAS Director of Operations)
1. Call to order: Chair Tuneski called the meeting to order at 6:00 p.m.
2. Public comment:
3. Previous Minutes: Motion by Keatley, second by Muckle, to approve the March 27, 2025, minutes as presented.
Voice Vote: Unanimous.
4. Consideration of FSRSC’s charge from the RTM (6/7/21):
a. Discuss Draft 1 of first half of report: Chair announced that RTM Moderator Goldstein has expressed his desire to have
the final report presented at the RTM’s June 4 meeting. He asked for members to submit all their comments to him in
the next week so that he can tally comments and requests for additional information for review at next meeting.
b. Initial feedback Draft 1 of second half of report: Chair explained that this version is a template for input, and that while
most information was provided by Director Howley, he also gathered information from the town website and Planning
and Finance Directors, and consulted the IAFC’s Blue Ribbon and Red Ribbon reports. Based on comments from people
outside the committee that the first half draft was “sterile,” he altered the style for the second half in order to make it
more educational for the public.
Discussion focused on fleshing it out; Chair noted that Sinagra could contribute information on the communications
upgrades, efforts continue to get response time data from individual stations and response headcounts for incidents. He
noted that there is still much to be done regarding the capital and fleet management plans and suggested we consider
having a structural engineer prepare reports on the Cohanzie, Gashen, Jordan, and Quaker Hill stations. We are also
lacking information on WAS, other than their current ambulance staffing is one 24-hr shift and one 16-hr shift. Condon
noted that draft contains education, but lacks information on decisions or how/why current status exist—for example,
advisory members Patton and Williams could provide insight into the evolution to a 3 core/2 outsider stations system.
He pointed out that in the 1980s response times were “easy” to determine, but now the goal is to determine how long it
takes to get enough responders on scene. Such information, he added, is haw we lean in to staffing recommendations.
c. Continue discussion on outside review: Passed over.
5, Next meeting: Consensus to tentatively schedule next meeting for Monday, May 19, at 6:00 p.m. Location thd.
6. Adjournment: Motion by Condon; second by Keatley to adjourn at 7:04 p.m. Voice vote: Unanimous,
Submitted by
Susan Driscoll, FSRSC Secretary

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Fire Services Review Special Committee Minutes~-Special Meeting May 29, 2025
Members Present: Robert Tuneski (BOF); Susan Driscoll (RTM); Tim Condon (RTM Public Protection & Safety Comm.);
Matthew Keatley (RTM—on phone); Richard Muckle (BoS); Ronnie Williams (WFD); Fire Services Director Chris Haley
Members Absent: Todd Patton (Chief, Goshen Fire Co.}; Steven Sinagra (Director, Emergency Management);
Mark Greczkowski (WAS Director of Operations)
Also present: John Mariano (Chief, Cohanzie Fire Co.}; David Dow (Chief, Quaker Hill Fire Co.)
1. Call to order: Chair Tuneski called the meeting to order at 6:00 p.m.
2. Public comment: Ursula Moreshead offered comments on the need for strategic planning for entire service
(attached).
3. Consideration of FSRSC’s charge from the RTM (6/7/21):
a. Receive/review comments on draft of second half of report: Condon stated that while the outline was a good
start, the drafts don’t seem to match it and seem to include data not in the record or Howley’s opinions. Inclusion
of the regulations are good, he added, but there is no bridging between them and what we have to do to comply.
He added that we need more input from all the advisory members’ graups, not just the Director, and we need a
faster way to flush out the data. He suggested that we need a roadmap of how best to scale up, with a ranking of
each station’s needs and capabilities. He offered his opinion that the station that should be next to get additional
staffing would be Quaker Hill rather than Oswegatchie because the narthern section is a “staffing desert” and
that recent adjustments/cutbacks in Montville mean that we can no longer count on Montville for mutual aid up
there as we have in the past.
Haley cautioned the committee to remember that data is liquid, impacted by outside influences such as Covid,
business and residential development, and even changes in traffic valume. There has been some restructuring
over the years, and recent addition of 24/7 staffing, but Fire Services is forced to be agile and is still desperately
working to provide minimum standards of service. Recommendations for six months or so are one thing, he
added, but the situation and needs could be very different in a couple of years.
Williams reported that he has requested response time data for the past 6 years, to include pre-Covid data, and
that it should be available by the next meeting. Condon painted out that the committee hasn't seen any of the
revisions from earlier comments and the report seems to be built around a preconceived notion. Muckle stated
that the Chair has full authority to edit the report as he sees fit and that we've had several comprehensive
reviews of fire services over the years and they all determined that 5 stations are best. Driscoll pointed out that
those reviews were all done 15 or more years ago and there was no decision on whether 5 stations are the best
system; the fact is that 5 stations exist and were built by private groups long before decades of development
altered the demands on fire services. She said the questian now is how can or should the town best utilize them.

FSRSC Minutes 5/29/25 page 2 of 2
Condon said that whatever the final recommendations the report provides, Haley will need the support of the
community behind him. Chair added that he wants to collect all written comments into a spreadsheet so we can
track them and then he will bring them al! together so the group can decide what goes into final version.
b, Consider releasing draft report to new Fire Services Director: Haley stated that charting data such as response
times would be like making a wall out of water. He explained that there are vast inconsistencies in the current and
previous systems, such as part-time shifts going unfilled, that make it difficult to identify trends. He would not use
current results because in his opinion things today are being held together for survival and we need to get certain
efficiencies in place. He added that all we can say is that certain results have changed since the implementation
of 24/7 coverage in some stations. Condon stated that we can use metrics to show certain changes and be able to
say “how many responded in what amount of time.” He added that response times are based more on adequate
staffing rather than location and that while everyone says the fleet needs to be reduced, the new OSW station
plan adds a bay and the politicians are saying we need a new building.
Haley noted that some of the information seems to have been taken from the plan he supplied for his interview,
which included ideas on how to increase staffing, with offsetting savings to lessen the Impact. He added that
everyone invalved in his interview process was on board with acknowledging the system needs to be fixed.
Chair entertained motion to give drafts to Haley for his formal review. Driscoll noted that there is no need for
official release; as advisory member, the Director has the drafts and will be part of the ongoing discussions,
comments, and revisions as well as part of the decision-making process. She also asked if the Director would
share his proposal with the entire committee.
Motion to have Director review draft by Muckle, second by Condon.
Motion passed: Yes-4 No-0 Abstain-1 (Driscoll)
c. Consider releasing draft report to RTM: Chair reiterated RTM Moderator’s request to have report for June
meeting te supplement discussion on OSW bonding and entertained motion to present draft version to RTM.
Muckle suggested that the draft be submitted with an FYI-only provision, so that RTM wouldn’t comment.
Condon and Driscoll noted that presenting it formally would demand comment/discussion by RTM and if any
members were curious about FSRSC progress they could find the drafts in our minutes. Condon also argued that a
draft presentation would make our credibility razor-thin and endanger our final report, which seems to have all
been predicated on a need for a new station but has no data supporting that premise. He added that Cohanzle
and Quaker Hill have also been suffering from long-time maintenance issues, but we haven’t discussed them at all
and the committee needs a decision-making process that is consistent and verified and involves input fram all
advisory members. Chair noted that we'll be getting initial comments from Haley at next meeting, and that we
should then be able to issue the final report and be done rather than drag on. Chair then entertained motion to
release draft to RTM. No motion offered.
4. Next meeting: Chair asked members who had written comments to send them to him and Driscoll the next day; he
added that he would relay request to absent advisory members so comments could be reviewed at next meeting.
Consensus to schedule next meeting for Wednesday, June 18, at 6:00 p.m. at Cohanzie Fire Station.
5. Adjournment: Motion by Muckie; second by Keatley to adjourn at 8:15 p.m. Voice vate: Unanimous.
Submitted by
Susan Driscoll, FSRSC Secretary
encl: Moreshead public comment

Public Comment for Fire Services Review Special Committee
5/29/25
Since the creation of this committee in 2021, what information has been collected on the
condition of the OFS before the decision was made to completely rebuild? |s there an
itemized list of what needs to be repaired at the station?
Asking the town’s residents to pay $12 million towards a brand-new fire station is
nonsensical if the bones of the building are good. | can’t imagine that a new roof and other
necessary repairs would cost as much as it will to rebuild.
The BoS voted to table the resolution recommending the appropriation and bond
authorization of $12 million. This decision was smart, and it’s a refreshing change from the
frantic rhetoric that the fire station js literally collapsing on top of people’s heads.
if we’re looking at the trajectory of the town’s fire services and the predictive issues around
a country-wide reduction tn firefighting staff (both paid and volunteer), we should be
looking at making needed repairs, not rebuilds, in anticipation of consolidating stations.
Has anyone tried bringing OFS and JFS to the table to talk about strategic planning?
Combining staff and equipment is the smart decision to make because if the number of
staff continue to decline, the $12 million building will be obsolete.
A member of the BoF suggested that the town reduce the bonding to $8 million and take the
remaining balance from the General Fund to bring the cost dawn and make it more
palatable for the taxpayers. Its shell games and decisions like these that create mistrust
across the board, resulting in push-back from the public and, ultimately, from members of
the RTM.
1 would recommend that the town use some of the $2.9 million from the OFS Building
Renovations account to fund an outside consultant who can take an overarching look at
the town’s current needs and give recommendations to prepare for predictive changes
within fire services.
Ursula Moreshead Lee Kias’
59 North Rd.
Waterford, CT. 06385
(860) 917-2347
Sacielcox@sbcgtobal. net

| know that a couple of these issues are from the first half of the draft, but | read the
document in its entirety, and there are still errors that were pointed out at the meeting
before May 1, 2025.
The term hybrid should be replaced with combination throughout the entire document.
The Waterford Fire Commission was established on 4/5/1971 and formally disbanded in
2010.
Why does responding to one incident constitute being active? The volunteer stipend
program requires a minimum of 50 incidents (responding to emergencies, trainings, and
meetings}. So, shouldn’t 50 incidents be considered the minimum number to be listed as
active?
Also, it still says that career and volunteer firefighters are trained to the same level; this
isn’t true.
Comments from the second half of the draft are as follows:
The total responses graph should indicate that the noted decline in responses from 2019-
2022 was during the COVID-19 epidemic, where responses were altered to minimize the
responder's expasure and risk of contracting the virus.
Linda Finnigan stated that she provided average response times for apparatus from the
years 2018 through February of 2025, yet the report only shows the year 2022.
The report mentions a risk assessment to determine needs. When was the last time that a
fire department risk assessment was performed? They should be reviewed annually.
The graph with the staffing plan shows that the plan is to hire 3 full-time firefighters per year
through the year 2030, except for the years 2026-2027. The graph shows that the running
total would be 18 full-time firefighters, when the actual number would be 30. This will bring
the town to 3 shifts would 10 firefighters per shift.
Along with the staffing plans, the number of fire apparatus we have should be considered.
The apparatus that we currently have isn’t listed in the report. it should show that we have 7
fire engines, 2 Ladder trucks, 1 elevated master stream, 1 Rescue truck, 6 pick-up trucks, 3
brush trucks, 2 boats, and 1 UTV, as well as 3 vehicles attached to the Fire Marshal's office.
This large amount of apparatus should be looked at to see if the amount of apparatus that
we have is necessary. Is it cost-efficient to keep and maintain this amount of apparatus?
Especially considering that the Waterford Fire Department doesn’t have enough people ta
fill these apparatuses. The number of apparatuses in town should be reduced and vehicles
relocated for a more sufficient response.

The communications section should note that the town has purchased new pagers for the
volunteers. Also, we are in the process of transitioning to the state radio system to replace
our current radio system.
The Waterford Ambulance section is blank. Some items that should be listed there are:
Waterford Ambulance is a private contractor operating out of its privately owned building
located at 454 Boston Post Road. They operate their ambulances out of this one location,
providing 1 ambutance 24 hours a day. And, 1 ambulance for 16 hours from 08:00-G0:00.
Waterford Ambulance is a private contractor whose employees are not employed by the
town of Waterford. The Waterford ambulance service pays Waterford an annual fee for
using our radios, radio system, and dispatching services.
Another thing to think about is, would it be better for the residents of Waterford for us to
continue using a contracted ambulance service, or to take the PSA and provide our own
emergency ambulances? Currently, if both Waterford Ambulances are on calls, there is a
delay in getting an ambulance on scene while they attempt to assemble a crew. If they
aren’t able to assemble a crew, we then get a mutual aid ambulance. This causes a delay in
the transport of a patient. The Waterford Fire Department currently responds to medical
emergencies under a supplemental R-1 license to provide medical care. Since the
ambulance service is a private contractor, they have no operational standing within the
emergency services in the Town of Waterford.
Under the volunteer decline and professional growth, it should state that the full-time
career staff operate out of the Jordan and Cohanzie fire companies, the part-time
firefighters operate out of the Oswegatchie, Goshen, and Quaker Hill fire companies when
available.
The draft mentions the original volunteer agreements and cites (ref x). What do the original
volunteer agreements say? Are the town and the volunteers meeting the expectations set
forth within these original agreements? There should be a matrix to evaluate these
agreements to ensure that both sides are meeting their expectations.
Under the key questions section:
Under periodic review:
It says that our staffing should undergo periodic review; if that’s the case, fire services
should be reviewed at the same interval.
There is a section that states that the training barrier should be lowered to increase
participation. No matter what the individual's role is within the department, training
expectations should never be lowered to make things easier, just to get people involved.

Along with lowering the training barrier, towards the end, there is a section that says we
should expand the roles for people who don’t want to do full firefighting. However, the
examples listed are actually tasks that would fall under public works and a CERT team. Not
the fire department.
Under the conclusion section:
Arecommendation is that we change the organization's name to Emergency Services ora
First Responder Department. We should not be changing the name of an organization
because the number of structural fires has declined. Plus, this would require opening the
charter, which wouid allow for anything in the charter to be addressed.
Where it says that we should demonstrate results to the public, it should say that we
demonstrate success through statistics, not objective, believable statistics.
Under mutual aid:
Should Waterford begin to look into automatic aid agreements with our mutual aid partners
for specific incident types due to our lack of personnal?
Under Legal Basis:
It says that the town of Waterford retains sole discretion in regards to mutual aid; typically,
this discretion is with the Director of Fire Services or the on-duty Chief Officer. It should say
the on-duty Captain, unless it is going to be the recommendation of this committee to
promote the captains to battalion chiefs.
Under why 5 stations matter:
It says Interstate 98 instead of Interstate 95.
In the draft, the square mileage of the town is listed at 37 and 38 square miles.
Under Infrastructure readiness:
Has this committee toured all of the fire stations and seen their current state? Some of the
fire stations may require more than routine maintenance. For example, the upper bay floor
at Jordan, the bathrooms at Jordan, and the ventilation system at Jordan. Not to mention
capital improvement projects, which are in queue, these projects would be considered
more than routine maintenance.
Under Looking forward:
It says we must evolve into a modern emergency services and first responder organization.
This should be removed; it isn’t an industry-recognized term, nor is it in the town charter.

Therefore, the Waterford Fire Department shouldn't be referred to as such. A more
acceptable term would be Waterford Fire and Rescue, but this would still require a change
in the town charter.
Under why Oswegatchie Matters:
It is listed that it creates an ideal location for a future command center for Waterford’s growing
team of career firefighters. However, this is not an ideal location. This building is going to be on
a Western outskirt of town; an ideal Jocation would be more in the center of town.
Advances Waterford’s transition toward a combination fire services model, blending
career firefighters and volunteer support, consistent with national best practices and
Waterford’s evolving needs. This shouldn’t be in the report, this isn’t a fact, this is an oginion.
Anew, state-of-the-art station will boost the recruitment and retention of both career
and volunteer firefighters, Again, this is an opinion and shouldn’t be in the report. If there is a
study to support this information, then it should be attached to the report to indicate so.
Delaying construction would significantly escalate costs, potentially requiring $15-20
million within 7-10 years for new construction and interim repairs. If this is the estimated cost
for 7-10 years out, why isn’t the current cost listed in this draft? If the town is trying to be
fiscally responsible for the taxpayer, shouldn’t you also be transparent about the cost and
where their tax dollars are going?
Volunteer availability is used in the determination of staffing decisions. Sa, if volunteer
availability is a factor in staffing, then our current reporting software should be used to
generate reports on the volunteer response to incidents. If volunteer availability is a factor,
then volunteer responses should be regularly reviewed. And this should be listed under data-
driven staffing decisions.
The report calls for the creation of internships and a junior firefighter program. These are both
programs that already exist.
This report should also inciude the volunteer incentive program. What it is, what the volunteers
are offered, and how much they get from it.
The Town of Waterford has recognized that a minimum of 3 firefighters constitutes a crew. The
NIST study on fireground residential experiments provides numerous examples of how having a
3 person crew is more beneficial than a 2 person crew. This should be cited in the report as well
as the NIST study. A recommendation in the report should be that the 3 center stations each be
staffed with a minimum of 3 firefighters.



April 2010
NIST Technical Note 1661
Report on Residential
Fireground Field Experiments
Jason D. Averill
Lori Moore-Merrell
Adam Barowy
Robert Santos
Richard Peacock
Kathy A. Notarianni
Doug Wissoker
Edited by Bill Robinson
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U.S. Department of Commerce
Gary Locke, Secretary
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Patrick D. Gallagher, Director

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may
be identified in this document in order to describe an
experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such
identification is not intended to imply recommendation or
endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the entities,
materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available
for the purpose.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Technical Note 1661,
104 pages (March 2010) CODEN:
Produced with the Cooperation of Produced with the Cooperation of
Montgomery County Fairfax County
Fire and Rescue Fire and Rescue
Chief Richard Bowers Chief Ronald Mastin
Funding provided through DHS/FEMA Grant Program Directorate for FY 2008
Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program — Fire Prevention and Safety Grants
(EMW-2008-FP-01603)

NUT
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
U.S, Departinent of Commerce

Table of Contents
ADSHACE sce cssscsntesecsesensnensssecessnessssusseenencransssanscersssesaneecstesssseecsearse 9
Executive Sturmimary ve. cccsecsecseseesssseecesesssssseeneetssessceeaeenenaneenerse 10
Bah ground .....cssscseseenssssssaressscccaveessucesensesstscescaneessusesenavescsiscsnenneasea 12
PRODIOM oc eseecsessaeeseesseestsensaeessscnsersscecartsnaeesesaesaeeeseeeineeseessonseneenee 13
Review Of Literature wos sssssssessessssecssssssatensssesssnnansssseessentenees 14
Purpose and Scope of the Study
A Briet Overview of Fire Depariment Fireground Operations...17
The Relation of Time-to-Task Completion atid RISK wesc 18
Standards of Response COVE r......csssssssesssssecssmesssescssneetsressesneeseneess 18
Part 1: Planning for the Field Experiments......ccsessssseerecnsseenee 20
Part 2: Time-to-Task Experiments oc scsecesssescssnseensseseessrensnas 24
Field Experiment Methods oo. cssssssscesssesssessssseesseecsssnersenesessee 21
Field Site ..
Overview of Field Experiments ..
Instrumentation .....ceeccsseccsseessmscssesssmeenseessaessssessssensearessaenseeessanens 22
Safety Protocols .....escsssscsecsessenesserseecaeenmssuesnecesssaneensessiesaienestaenees 23
CHOW SIZO ascesccsssessesescsenenteereessosecessecenmesseecatecaeesiecastsaecsisenensaeseee 24
Department Participation ....ccssssesssccsesseensssescsesssmescaveesssmesennnscassees 24
COW OFIONIARION oo ccsessscernetsetersneessseneenssssnersaesasecansescssnenessaneanenanessees
Tasks ....
Data Collection: Standardized Control Measures
Task Flow Charts and Crew Cue Cards ....eessecsssesssetessstessseensneee 27
Radio COMMUNICATIONS ......csccsecressenssseesstessnesnecssteenesenmsetsensseeentesvseen 27
Task TIMEGIS ..scctssessssessseesseeseeseseteseeeerecsmessesceceaneesntsnmessseanesnmeeanenaetsenes 27
Vid@O PECOLdS cocsesssessssecssesstesceensetenccensessseenecseesanansesnuentansssssantenensees 27
Crew ASSIGNMONt ...ssscsccsseccenecsnsseeccessstssengenssssinsnesssisnieegssssmanreeeessee 28
Response Time ASSUMPHONS....cssesssesseseeeestecetsesensssnteasecsreeanenneneennen Qe,
Part 3: Room and Contents Fires... ssccsasssessennesneennesssenseestes 29
Fuel Packages for the Room and Contents Fires .....sssessssssscceeeen 29
Experimental Matrix for Room and Contents Fires .....scsssecssseessee 30
Procedure for Minimizing the Effect of Variance in Fire Growth Rate ........6 31
Analysis of Experimental Results .
Time-to-task Analysis... secsssssesessssencensscsseorssssseotssvesaessacsecteseseenees 33
Data QUEHES wocsersetusseerssiassereesnatseserseetuniersresssiniraseetssesnsssenssersceeet OO
Statistical Methods - Time to Task ....scscsssssessseesscesneesssessassnnessssssensses dd
Regression Analysis .....seccsssssssssseessessessrensessnseneeseessneceeesantsasessansaeenes 33
Measurement Uncertainty ..cesesscssesseonssssersesseseneecessceatnerseessiennee 34
How to interpret Time-to-Task Graphs......ccccsscsecsecscssceseertesseseeeneee 34
Time-to-Task Graphs ....
Part 4: Fire Modeling .
Time ta Untenable Conditions: Research Questions ....ccsuendd
Fire Modeling Methods .....scscsscsssssssscsteensresssssererserearsatessenesecseeseesn 4
Fire Growth Rates.....ssscecccssessesssssescenssesenesnseesssvereneessseerenensesees GO
Fractional Effective Dose (FED)... essere 4?
Results from Modeling Methods .....sssssesssescesesssansssssernsseseeansasessereseed 48
Interior Firefighting Conditions and Deployment Contiguration ........ 49
Physiolagical Effects on Firefighters: Comparison by Crew Size
Study Limitations. ecsenccssessseesessassscensesssessnsesssissaseannececerenesseed
GONCHUSIONS.....esccssccessessanecsneseecesseannessenseassseesensseessstssaossseesnuesseeannese De
Future ROSCAr Ci ces ccccccsssescecsssssncsnescnsssesecnessetseccaseesenssseessnnerenaenessentes 53
Acknowledgments 0. cesssssessssctcseesansesesentecssenseaesmretsseeneenetee 55
REPEYONGCES es scsceecssseescnessssensenesesseencsstsssaeceeessaveceeenestsaeeeneesssaie 56


Abstract
Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural
disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of
terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local
decision-makers are challenged to balance these community
service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical
foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment
decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters.
For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying
crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on
firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential
tenability using realistic residential fires, This study is also unique
because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical
experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field
experiments included customized instrumentation; all related
industry standards were followed; and robust research methods
were used, The results and conclusions will directly inform the
NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for
developing consensus industry deployment standards,
S== expectations placed on the fire service, including
This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and
residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the
effects of various fire department deployment configurations on
the most common type of fire — a low hazard residential
structure fire, For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186
m?), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the
Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in
Rockville, MD, Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and
Fairfax County, VA were deployed in response to live fires within
this facility. In addition to systematically controlling for the
arrival times of the first and subsequent fire apparatus, crew size
was varied to consider two-, three-, four-, and five-person staffing.
Each deployment performed a series of 22 tasks that were timed,
while the thermal and toxic environment inside the structure was
measured. Additional experiments with larger fuel loads as well as
fire modeling produced additional insight. Report results quantify
the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and
apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and ‘time to completion
of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and
firefighter safety.

Executive Summary
growing number of Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
responses, challenges from natural disasters, hazardous
materials incidents, and acts of terrorism — and previous research
point to the need for scientifically based studies of the effect of
different crew sizes and firefighter arrival times on the effectiveness of
the fire service to protect lives and property. To meet this need, a
research partnership of the Commission on Fire Accreditation
International (CFAN), International Association of Fire Chiefs (AFC),
International Association of Firefighters (LAFF), National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), and Worcester Polytechnic
Institute (WPI) was formed to conduct a multiphase study of the
deployment of resources as it affects firefighter and occupant safety.
Starting in FY 2005, funding was provided through the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) / Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) Grant Program Directorate for Assistance to Firefighters
Grant Program —— Fire Prevention and Safety Grants. In addition to
the low-hazard residential fireground experiments described in this
report, the multiple phases of the overall research effort include
development of a conceptual model for community risk assessment
and deployment of resources, implementation of a generalizable
department incident survey, and delivery of a software tool to quantify
the effects of deployment decisions on resultant firefighter and civilian
injuries and on property losses,
The first phase of the project was an extensive survey of more than
400 career and combination (both career and volunteer) fire
departments in the United States with the objective of optimizing a
fire service leader’s capability to deploy resources to prevent or
mitigate adverse events that occur in risk- and hazard-filled
environments. The results of this survey are not documented in this
report, which is limited to the experimental phase of the project.
The survey results will constitute significant input into the
development of a future software tool to quantify the effects of
community risks and associated deployment decisions on resultant
firefighter and civilian injuries and property losses.
B= the increasing demands on the fire service - such as the
The following research questions guided the experimental
design of the low-hazard residential fireground experiments
documented in this report:
1. How do crew size and stagger affect overall start-to-completion
response timing?
2. How do crew size and stagger affect the timings of task
initiation, task duration, and task completion for each of the 22
critical fireground tasks?
3. How does crew size affect elapsed times to achieve three critical
events that are known to change fire behavior or tenability
within the structure:
a. Entry into structure?
b. Water on fire?
c. Ventilation through windows (three upstairs and one back
downstairs window and the burn room window).
4. How does the elapsed time to achieve the national standard of
assembling 15 firefighters at the scene vary between crew sizes
of four and five?
In order to address the primary research questions, the research
was divided into four distinct, yet interconnected parts:
@ Part 1 —- Laboratory experiments to design appropriate fuel load
@ Part 2 — Experiments to measure the time for various crew
sizes and apparatus stagger (interval between arrival of
various apparatus) to accomplish key tasks in rescuing
occupants, extinguishing a fire, and protecting property
& Part 3 — Additional experiments with enhanced fuel load that
prohibited firefighter entry into the burn prop ~ a building
constructed for the fire experiments
& Part 4 — Fire modeling to correlate time-to-task completion
by crew size and stagger to the increase in toxicity of the
atmosphere in the burn prop for a range of fire growth rates.
The experiments were conducted in a burn prop designed to
simulate a low-hazard' fire in a residential structure described as
typical in NEPA 1710® Organization and Deployment of Fire
Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special
Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments. NFPA 1710 is
the consensus standard for career firefighter deployment,
including requirements for fire department arrival time, staffing
levels, and fireground responsibilities.
Limitations of the study include firefighters’ advance knowledge
of the burn prop, invariable number of apparatus, and lack of
experiments in elevated outdoor temperatures or at night. Further,
the applicability of the conclusions from this report to commercial
structure fires, high-rise fires, outside fires, terrorism/natural
disaster response, HAZMAT or other technical responses has not
been assessed and should not be extrapolated from this report.
Primary Findings
Of the 22 fireground tasks measured during the experiments,
results indicated that the following factors had the most
significant impact on the success of fire fighting operations. All
differential outcomes described below are statistically significant
at the 95 % confidence level or better.
Overall Scene Time:
The four-person crews operating on a low-hazard structure fire
completed ail the tasks on the fireground (on average) seven
minutes faster —- nearly 30 % — than the two-person crews. The
four-person crews completed the same number of fireground
tasks (on average) 5.1 minutes faster — nearly 25 % — than the
three-person crews, On the low-hazard residential structure fire,
adding a fifth person to the crews did not decrease overall
fireground task times. However, it should be noted that the
1 A low-hazard occupancy is defined in the NFPA Handbook as a one-, two-, or three-family dwelling and some small businesses, Medium hazards occupancies include
apartments, offices, mercantile and industrial occupancies not normally requiring extensive rescue or firefighting forces. High-hazard occupancies include schools,
hospitals, nursing homes, explosive plants, refineries, high-rise buildings, and other highlife hazard or farge fire potential occupancies.
10

benefit of five-person crews has been documented in other
evaluations to be significant for medium- and high-hazard
structures, particularly in urban settings, and is recognized in
industry standards.’
Time to Water on Fire:
There was a 10% difference in the “water on fire” time between
the two- and three-person crews. There was an additional 6%
difference in the “water on fire" time between the three- and
four-person crews. (i.e., four-person crews put water on the fire
16% faster than two person crews). There was an additional 6%
difference in the “water on fire” time between the four- and
five-person crews (i.e. five-person crews put water on the fire 22%
faster than two-person crews).
Ground Ladders and Ventilation:
The four-person crews operating on a low-hazard structure fire
completed laddering and ventilation (for life safety and rescue)
30 % faster than the two-person crews and 25 % faster than the
three-person crews.
Primary Search:
The three-person crews started and completed a primary search
and rescue 25 % faster than the two-person crews. The four- and
five-person crews started and completed a primary search 6 %
faster than the three-person crews and 30 % faster than the
two-person crew. A 10 % difference was equivalent to just over
one minute.
Hose Stretch Time:
In comparing four-and five-person crews to two-and
three-person crews collectively, the time difference to stretch a line
was 76 seconds. In conducting more specific analysis comparing
all crew sizes to the two-person crews the differences are more
distinct. Two-person crews took 57 seconds longer than
three-person crews to stretch a line. Two-person crews took
87 seconds longer than four-person crews to complete the same
tasks. Finally, the most notable comparison was between
two-person crews and five-person crews — more than 2 minutes
(122 seconds) difference in task completion time.
industry Standard Achieved:
As defined by NFPA 1710, the “industry standard achieved”
time started from the first engine arrival at the hydrant and ended
when [5 firefighters were assembled on scene.’ An effective
response force was assembled by the five-person crews three
minutes faster than the four-person crews. Based on the study
protocols, modeled after a typical fire department apparatus
deployment strategy, the total number of firefighters on scene in
the two- and three-person crew scenarios never equaled 15 and
therefore the two- and three-person crews were unable to
assemble enough personnel to meet this standard.
Occupant Rescue:
Three different “standard” fires were simulated using the Fire
Dynamics Simulator (FDS) model. Characterized in the
Handbook of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers as slow-,
medium-, and fast-growth rate’, the fires grew exponentially with
time. The rescue scenario was based on a non-ambulatory
occupant in an upstairs bedroom with the bedroom door open.
Independent of fire size, there was a significant difference between
the toxicity, expressed as fractional effective dose (FED), for
occupants at the time of rescue depending on arrival times for all
crew sizes. Occupants rescued by early-arriving crews had less
exposure to combustion products than occupants rescued by
late-arriving crews. The fire modeling showed clearly that
two-person crews cannot complete essential freground tasks in time
to rescue occupants without subjecting them to an increasingly toxic
atmosphere. For a slow-growth rate fire with two-person crews, the
FED was approaching the level at which sensitive populations, such
as children and the elderly are threatened. For a medium-growth
rate fire with two-person crews, the FED was far above that
threshold and approached the level affecting the general population.
For a fast-growth rate fire with two-person crews, the FED was well
above the median level at which 50 % of the general population
would be incapacitated. Larger crews responding to slow-growth
rate fires can rescue most occupants prior to incapacitation along
with early-arriving larger crews responding to medium-growth rate
fires. The result for late-arriving (two minutes later than
early-arriving) larger crews may result in a threat to sensitive
populations for medium-growth rate fires. Statistical averages
should not, however, mask the fact that there is no FED level so low
that every occupant in every situation is safe.
Conclusion:
More than 60 full-scale fire experiments were conducted to
determine the impact of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and
subsequent apparatus arrival times on firefighter safety and
effectiveness at a low-hazard residential structure fire. This report
quantifies the effects of changes to staffing and arrival times for
residential firefighting operations. While resource deployment is
addressed in the context of a single structure type and risk level, it is
recognized that public policy decisions regarding the cost-benetit of
specific deployment decisions are a function of many other factors
including geography, local risks and hazards, available resources, as
well as community expectations. This report does not specifically
address these other factors.
The results of these field experiments contribute significant
knowledge to the fire service industry. First, the results provide a
quantitative basis for the effectiveness of four-person crews for
low-hazard response in NFPA 1710. The results also provide valid
measures of total effective response force assembly on scene for
fireground operations, as well as the expected performance
time-to-critical-task measures for low-hazard structure fires.
Additionally, the results provide tenability measures associated
with a range of modeled fires.
Future research should extend the findings of this report in
order to quantify the effects of crew size and apparatus arrival
times for moderate- and high-hazard events, such as fires in
high-rise buildings, commercial properties, certain factories, or
warehouse facilities, responses to large-scale non-fire incidents, or
technical rescue operations.
2 NFPA Standard 1710 - A.5.2.4.2,1 ...Other occupancies and structures in the community that present greater hazards should be addressed by additional fire fighter
functions and additional responding personnel on the initial full alarm assignment.
3 NEPA [710 Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by
Career Fire Departments, Section 5.2.1 — Fire Suppression Capability and Section 5.2.2 Staffing.
4 As defined in the handbook, a fast fire grows exponentially to 1.0 MW in 150 seconds, A medium fire grows exponentially to 1 MW in 300 seconds. A slow fire grows
exponentially to 1 MW in 600 seconds. A | MW fire can be thought-of as a typical upholstered chair burning at its peak. A large sofa might be 2 to 3 MWs,
"1

Background
tradition of service to community and country dating back
hundreds of years. As technology advances and the scope
of service grows (e.g., more EMS obligations and growing
response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and
acts of terrorism), the fire service remains committed to a core
mission of protecting lives and property from the effects of fire.
Firefighting is a dangerous business with substantial financial
implications. In 2007, U.S. municipal fire departments responded
to an estimated 1,557,500 fires, These fires killed 3,430 civilians
(non-firefighters) and contributed to 17,675 reported civilian fire
injuries. Direct property damage was estimated at $14.6 billion
dollars (Karter, 2008). In spite of the vigorous nationwide efforts
T: fire service in the United States has a deservedly proud
12
to promote firefighter safety, the number of firefighter deaths has
consistently remained tragically high. In both 2007 and 2008, the
USS, Fire Administration reported 118 firefighter fatalities (USFA
2008).
Although not all firefighter deaths occur on the fireground —
accidents in vehicles and training fatalities add to the numbers —
every statistical analysis of the fire problem in the United States
identifies residential structure fires as a key component in
firefighter and civilian deaths, as well as direct property loss.
Consequently, community planners and decision-makers need
tools for optimally aligning resources with the service
commitments needed for adequate protection of citizens.

Problem
States, there are no scientifically based tools available to
community and fire service leaders to assess the effects of
prevention, fixed sprinkler systems, fire fighting equipment, or
deployment and staffing decisions. Presently, community and fire
service leaders have a qualitative understanding of the effect of
certain resource allocation decisions. For example, a decision to
double the number of firehouses, apparatus, and firefighters
would likely result in a decrease in community fire losses, while
cutting the number of firehouses, apparatus, and firefighters
would likely yield an increase in the community fire losses, both
human and property. However, decision-makers lack a sound
D== the magnitude of the fire problem in the United
basis for quantifying the total impact of enhanced fire resources
on the number of firefighter and civilian lives saved and injuries
prevented.
Studies on adequate deployment of resources are needed to
enable fire departments, cities, counties, and fire districts to
design an acceptable level of resource deployment based upon
community risks and service provision commitment. These
studies will assist with strategic planning and municipal and state
budget processes. Additionally, as resource studies refine data
collection methods and measures, both subsequent research and
improvements to resource deployment models will have a sound
scientific basis,
13

Review of Literature
between resources deployed and firefighter and civilian
safety. Studies documenting engine and ladder crew
performance in diverse simulated environments as well as actual
responses show a basic relationship between apparatus staffing
levels and a range of important performance variables and
outcome measurements such as mean on-scene time, time-to-task
completion, incidence of injury among fire service personnel, and
costs incurred as a result of on-scene injuries (Cushman 1981,
McManis 1984, Morrison 1990, Ontario 1991, Phoenix 1991,
Roberts 1993).
Reports by fire service officials and consulting associates
reviewing fire suppression and emergency response by fire crews
in US, cities were the first publications to describe the
relationship between adequate staffing levels and response time,
time to completion of various fireground tasks, overall
effectiveness of fire suppression, and estimated value of property
loss for a wide range of real and simulated environments. In 1980,
the Columbus Fire Division’s report on firefighter effectiveness
showed that for a predetermined number of personnel initially
deployed to the scene of a fire, the proportion of incidents in
which property loss exceeded $5,000 and horizontal fire spread of
more than 25 sq ft (2.3 m”) was significantly greater for crews
whose numbers fell below the set thresholds of 15 total fireground
personnel at residential fires and 23 at large-risk fires (Backoff
1980). The following year, repeated live experiments at a
one-family residential site using modern apparatus and
equipment demonstrated that larger units performed tasks and
accomplished knockdown more quickly, ultimately resulting in a
lower percentage of loss attributable to factors controlled by the
fire department. The authors of this article highlighted that the
fire company is the fire department's basic working unit and
further emphasized the importance of establishing accurate and
up-to-date performance measurements to help collect data and
develop conclusive strategies to improve staffing and equipment
utilization (Gerard 1981).
Subsequent reports from the United States Fire Administration
(USFA) and several consulting firms continued to provide
evidence for the effects of staffing on fire crews’ ability to
complete tasks involved in fire suppression efficiently and
effectively. Citing a series of tests conducted in 1977 by the Dallas
Fire Department that measured the time it took three-, four-, and
five-person teams to advance a line and put water on a simulated
fire at the rear of the third floor of an old school, officials from the
USFA underscored that time-to-task completion and final level of
physical exhaustion for crews markedly improved not after any
one threshold, but with the addition of each new team member.
This report went on to outline the manner in which simulated
tests exemplify a clear-cut means to record and analyze the
resources initially deployed and finally utilized at fire scenes (NFA
1981). A later publication detailing more Dallas Fire Department
simulations — ninety-one runs each for a private residential fire,
high-rise office fire, and apartment house fire — showed again
that increased staffing levels greatly enhanced the coordination
and effectiveness of crews’ fire suppression efforts during a finite
time span (McManis Associates 1984). Numerous studies of local
departments have supported this conclusion using a diverse
collection of data, including a report by the National Fire
Re esearch to date has documented a consistent relationship
14
Academy (NF