Representative Town Meeting (RTM) - Minutes - 09/30/2026

FIFTEEN ROPE FERRY ROAD
WATEREORD, CT 06385-2886
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Legislation & Administration Committee of the RTM = Ss As
Meeting Minutes 
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September 30, 2026 
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Appleby Room, Waterford Town Hall 
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Members Present: Erica Casper, Mary Childs, Paul Goldstein 
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Members Absent: Emmeline Franklin, Danielle Steward-Gelinas 
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Also Present: Sue Driscoll, RTM moderator; John Scimone, Ethics Commission member
1.
Confirmation of Quorum and Call to Order
Chair Erica Casper called the meeting to order at 7:00PM.
Public Comment
None.
Consideration and Action on Minutes of the July 20, 2026 Committee Meeting
Motion by Mary Childs, seconded by Casper to approve the minutes. Paul Goldstein requested an
amendment to the previous meeting's minutes to include a packet of materials he had submitted to
provide context for his comments regarding the ethics ordinance. Motion to accept minutes as
amended by Goldstein, seconded by Childs. Voice vote unanimous in favor.
Review of Ethics Ordinance 2.50 (RTC 10/7/24)
The committee continued its review of the town's ethics ordinance. John Scimone, a member of
the Ethics Commission, presented a comparison of Waterford's ordinance with those of several
other Connecticut municipalities. He clarified that his review represented his individual research
and had not been formally considered or endorsed by the Ethics Commission. Although his written
presentation contained several areas for potential revision, Scimone highlighted three for
discussion: clarifying the definition of conflicts of interest, addressing the appearance of
impropriety, and establishing clearer procedures for handling ethics complaints involving multiple
respondents. Scimone’s document is included as an attachment to these minutes.
Committee members discussed the potential benefits and challenges of more specific conflict-of-
interest provisions, including whether certain restrictions would be permitted under state law.
Members referenced approaches used by other Connecticut municipalities and discussed seeking
guidance from the town attorney on specific legal questions.

The committee also discussed the handling of complaints involving multiple individuals, with
general support expressed for considering complaints separately. Additional discussion addressed
the availability of ethics-related guidance and advisory opinions, including how information is
provided to newly elected and appointed officials.
Members referenced past ethics matters when discussing potential conflicts of interest and
expressed differing views on whether additional restrictions were warranted. The committee also
briefly discussed provisions addressing consequences for ethics violations.
Goldstein also provided a photocopy of a newspaper article describing recent revisions to the
Town of Old Lyme's ethics ordinance. The article was offered as an example of changes adopted
by another municipality for the committee's consideration. A copy of the material submitted by
Goldstein is included as an attachment to these minutes,
While members generally supported clarifying definitions and procedures within the ordinance,
differing views remained regarding how broadly conflicts of interest should be defined and
whether additional restrictions should be imposed on public officials and employees. Members
also expressed differing opinions about whether the ordinance should address certain situations
involving personal or family relationships and participation in municipal decisions. The committee
did not reach consensus on these issues and agreed that further discussion was needed.
Next Steps
Members agreed to independently review the ordinance and identify specific language they would
recommend adding, removing, or revising, particularly regarding definitions and clarity.
Scimone’s comparative review will be circulated to committee members for reference.
The committee plans to continue reviewing proposed changes at its November meeting and
identify specific questions that may require review by the town attorney.
No proposed changes to the ethics ordinance were voted on or adopted at this meeting.
5. 
Future Meeting Schedule
Tentative timing for next meeting will be mid-November.
6. Adjournment
Motion to adjourn was made and seconded. Voice vote unanimous in favor. Meeting adjourned at
8:16PM.
Submitted by: Erica Casper
Chair, Legislation & Administration Committee of the RTM
Attachment: 
Supplemental materials provided by member Paul Goldstein
Draft of Ethics Review provided by John Scimone

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Comparative Review of Connecticut
Municipal Ethics Ordinance Language
and Suggested Changes to Waterford
Ethics Ordinances
Three Objectives for Waterford Code of Ordinances
Chapter 2.50
Submitted by: John Scimone
Date: 9/23/2026
Note that this document contains many useful hyperlinks and is intended to be viewed digitally
so the reader can take full advantage of this. A digital copy of this document-may be found at
https://cloud.scimone.net/s/ScaRJSBzYSbrEib for unofficial reference only.
What's in here
Who Chapter.2.50 covers — a threshold point, not one of the objectives. The chapter's two defined
terms are mutually exclusive, which.complicates any rule about people who serve the town twice, and
between them they leave the fire department's volunteers outside the code entirely. Two questions
are left open here, and both bear on how Objectives 1 through 3 would be drafted.
lL, Open questions
The three objectives
1 — Clarify what counts as a conflict of interest
Our test reaches only direct money, and nothing in the chapter reaches a personal or non-financial
interest. This would add personal interests, a de minimis exception for general policy matters, a rule
for town and board of education employees who serve on town bodies, and a duty to disclose on the
record. One question is left open: how far the bright line should go.
l, Suggested language - Open questions
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 1 of 30

2 — Add an appearance-of-impropriety standard
Chapter 2.50 has no general standard, though § 2.50.010(A) comes close and two operative
provisions already use appearance-style tests. This would add two phrases to that sentence and a
new operative standard with a reasonable-person test. One question is left open: whether the
standard should be enforceable on its own or aspirational.
l, Suggested language - Open questions
3 — Complaints that name more than one personSection 2.50.070 is silent. This would give each
respondent individual notice, an individual response, and an individual determination, following
Glastonbury, while leaving intake alone — a complainant could still name several people in one filing.
Greenwich goes further and severs the proceeding outright; the one Connecticut authority requiring
separate filings sits in a citizen's guide rather than an ordinance, and this draft follows neither.
l, Suggested language - Open questions
About this document
We're planning to hand the Legislation and.Administration Committee some suggested changes to
Chapter 2.50 that they can work from in putting together recommendations for the RTM. This
document pulls together what other Connecticut towns have written into their.ethics ordinances on the
questions we've been talking about, so we're not starting from a blank page.
Objectives 1 through 3 propose changes to the ordinance, and each is laid out the same way:
1. What Chapter 2.50 says now — our current text, quoted.
2. The gap —.what our language doesn't cover, and why that matters in practice.
3. How other Connecticut towns handle it — their actual text, with links to the sources.
4. Suggested language —.a draft to react to. Change it, cut it, replace it.
5. Open questions — the rea) choices, and suggested questions for the Town Attorney.
One thing to flag before we get into it. The draft language in part 4 of each objective is just my first
take. It's meant to be a starting point for discussion and editing.
Our current ordinance. Chapter.2.50, Ethics Commission, last amended by R.T.M. action on
December 7, 2020 — every section in the chapter is annotated "(R.T.M. 12-7-20)". Municode HTML.
Municode stamps that page with a version date of July 27, 2026, which is when Municode fast
republished the code as a whole; it is not an amendment date for this chapter.
For reference, here's how Chapter 2.50 is laid out:
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 2 of 30

Section
250.010 
Preamble and declaration of policy and purpose
250.040 
"Establishment of an ethics commission and operating procedures
2.50.050 
Adoption of rules of procedure | 
.
"2.50.070 
“Procedure for receiving and hearing complaints
250.080 
“Notice of hearing and decision
. 2.50,090 
Report of findings and opinions and recommendations __ 2
250.100 
Finances and compensation
2.50.110 
Effective date and reports
2.50.120 
Distribution of the code of ethics 
; 
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;
Who Chapter 2.50 covers
This section isn't one of the three objectives. It came out of the research, and it affects all three of the
amendments that follow,
Everything in Chapter 2.50 applies to “public officials" and "town employees" and to nobody else, Both
terms are defined in § 2.50.020, and how they're written decides who any amendments can actually
reach.
The two definitions
§ 2.50.020(E)** — “Town employee"** means “an individual working for salary or wages from the
town, including board of education employees, whether on a part-time or full-time basis and
whether the position is reviewed by personnel review board or not, but does not include the
town attorney or any public official."
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 3 of 30

§ 2.50.020(H)** — "Public official"** means "any elected official, including members of the board
of education and board of selectmen; or any individual, including the town attorney, appointed to
any town office, commission, agency, committee, board, or department by the representative
town meeting (R.T.M.), board of finance, board of education, first selectman, or board of
selecimen."
Four features of that pair do the work:
* They're mutually exclusive, and “public official" wins. A town employee who is elected or
appointed to a town body becomes a public official and stops being a "town employee” anywhere
in the chapter.
¢ "Public official" carries no pay requirement. That is how § 2.50.010(C) delivers on its promise
of a code for officials and employees "whether elected or appointed, paid or unpaid" — the
unpaid come in through this limb.
« Itreaches appointment to a "department," not only to a board or commission.
« But only by five named authorities —- the R.T.M.; board of finance, board of education, first
selectman, and board of selectmen. That is a closed list.
Where that leaves gaps
First, nobody can hold both terms at once. That matters for any rule aimed at people who serve the
town twice, because such a rule has to pick a subject, and either choice misses someone.
Second, the unpaid who weren't appointed by one of the five fall outside both definitions. "Town
employee" requires salary or wages. "Public official” requires election or appointment by the five.
Anyone who is neither paid nor appointed that way is in neither term, and so outside the chapter
entirely.
The fire department's volunteers are that second group. Section 2.36.030 provides that the Waterford
Fire Department "shall be staffed through volunteers and/or paid individuals," and § 2.36.040 makes
any qualifying individual, “volunteer.or paid," personnel of the Waterford Fire Department. Their
qualifications are set by the director of fire services and the director of human resources, neither.of
whom is on the five-authority list, so they aren't public officials. And they aren't paid, so they aren't
town employees.
They aren't quite unpaid, and the ordinance is careful about it. Section 2.36.080 runs an incentive
program providing "monetary compensation to active volunteer firefighters," but structures it as
expense reimbursement and expressly excludes "personnel employed by the Town of Waterford." The
town pays these people something and says in the same breath that they aren't employees.
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 4 of 30

Why it's a problem
The first gap defeats any dual-role rule we write. Tolland § 6-38, its rule for employees who serve
on town bodies and set out in full in Section 1.3, begins:
‘In addition to other restrictions of this chapter, 
a Town employee who serves on any
governmental body of the Town shail not vote or participate...”
Copy that subject into Chapter 2.50 and it reaches nobody: everyone who serves on a town bady is a
public official, and no public official is a town employee. The rule would describe a category our own
definitions treat as empty.
The second gap leaves real people outside a code that says it covers them. Fire department
personnel handle equipment and make purchasing recommendations, they receive town money under
§ 2.36,080, and § 2.50.010(C) states that the code reaches the unpaid. At present it doesn't reach
them.
Two boundaries are worth marking. For boards and commissions the closed list holds: Charter
Chapter IV assigns those appointments to the R.T.M. and Chapter V to the board of selectmen, the
ordinances lead back to the same authorities in every case checked —.the housing authority, building
committees, the regional Niantic River Gateway Commission — and Charter § 3.2.6 gives boards no
appointing power of their own. Departments are where it breaks, because departmental personnel are
engaged by directors and department heads. The second boundary is that. the gap stops at people
who serve the town: several entities named _in § 2.36.030 are private corporations the town.contracts
with, and a town ethics code governs the people who serve the town, not the internal affairs of its
contractors. Some Connecticut towns do reach further — Essex regulates agents, consultants and
contractors, and Tolland defines “paid consultant” and "large contractor” — but that's a separate
question we haven't taken up.
Possible solutions
For the coverage gap, widen the appointing authorities in § 2.50.020(H). Because "public official"
already has no pay requirement, this reaches unpaid departmental personnel without touching
anything else.
Suggested addition to the end of § 2.50.020(H) — proposed language, not current text:
...oF any individual who serves the town or the board of education without salary or wages and
_ 
who is appointed or designated to serve in any town office, commission, agency, committee,
| 
board, or department by any other board, commission, agency, committee, department, or
department head of the town.
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 5 of 30

The limitation to unpaid service is deliberate. Drafted more broadly — reaching anyone "engaged to
serve" in a department by a department head — it would capture ordinary paid staff, who are hired
exactly that way. They would become public officials, and since § 2.50.020(E) excludes public officials
from "town employee," every paid departmental employee would drop out of that term and out of the
provisions written for them.
For the mutual-exclusivity gap, there are three routes:
« Name both terms in each rule. What the draft in Section 1.4 does. Surgical and free of side
effects, but the oddity stays and the next drafter can fall into it again.
« Strike “or any public official" from the exclusion in § 2.50.020(E). Structurally the cleanest,
because it fixes the problem once rather than rule by rule. But five provisions bind “town
employees" without also naming public officials, and two would need repair alongside it: §
2.50.030(H), whose bar on using one's position to benefit a political party would otherwise catch
paid elected officials, and § 2.50.040(A), which would let allegations against board members be
routed to an agency's internal procedure instead of to us. The other three are harmless or helpful
— the union carve-out in § 2.50.030(G), the whistleblower-protection in § 2.50.070(A), and §
2.50.090(G), which keys off union membership rather than the definition.
« Define the population directly, adding a third term to § 2.50.020 for a public official who is also
a town or board of education employee. Leaves every existing provision untouched, at the cost of
another defined term.
My own view is that the second route is right: it fixes the problem at its source instead of working
around it in every rule we write from now on. The first is safe and,costs nothing. The third buys nothing
the second doesn't, at the price of another definition.
The draft in Section 1.4 takes the first route deliberately, because naming both terms works whichever
way the question is resolved and doesn't presuppose an answer. If the second route is taken, that belt-
and-braces wording can be trimmed back.
Open questions
1. Should the coverage gap be closed? The suggested addition above would bring the fire
department's volunteers, and anyone else serving unpaid outside the five authorities, inside the
chapter. The alternative is to treat the code as meant for paid staff and appointed members, and
to accept that § 2.50.010(C) overstates its reach.
2. Which of the three routes on mutual exclusivity? Worth settling early, because it changes how
much the R.T.M. would be asked to amend.
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 6 of 30

Suggested questions for the Town Attorney. Whether widening "public official" as suggested has
consequences elsewhere in the Code; whether it would reach volunteers serving through the private
fire companies the town contracts with under § 2.36.030; and whether any town department other than
the fire service is staffed by unpaid personnel who would be brought in by it.
Objective 1 — Clarify what counts as a conflict of
interest
1.1 What Chapter 2.50 says now
§ 2.50.030(A)** — the conflict standard:**
"Public officials or town employees have an interest that is in substantial conflict with the proper
discharge of duties or employment in the public interest and of responsibilities as prescribed by
the laws of this state if they have reason to believe or expect that they, their immediate family, or
a business with which they are associated will derive a direct monetary gain or suffer a direct
monetary loss, as the case may be, by reason of their official activity."
§ 2.50.030(B)** — the group exception:**
"Public officials or town employees do not have an interest that is in substantial conflict with the
proper discharge of duties in the public interest and of responsibilities as prescribed by the laws
of this state if any benefit or detriment accrues to them, their immediate family, or a business with
which they are associated as a member of a profession, occupation, or group to no greater extent
than any other member of such profession, occupation, or.group.”
§ 2.50.030(C)** — what happens then:**
"A public official or town employee may not take official action on.any matter in which a
substantial conflict (as defined in subsection A of this section) exists. If the conflict is disclosed, a
public official or town employee may participate in discussions with or give opinions or
recommendations to a town board, agency, commission, committee, department, or another
public official or town employee."
Section 2.50.030** doesn't stop at (C).** It runs through subsection (H): (D) covers using your position
for personal gain and keeping town information confidential; (E) covers unauthorized use of town
vehicles, equipment, and property; (F) covers gifts; (G) covers non-bid contracts; (H) covers special
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 7 of 30

treatment. Any new subsections have to be added after (H) — a point that matters when we get to the
draft in Section 1.4.
Who these provisions apply to is set by two definitions in § 2.50.020, and the way they fit
together causes problems for any rule aimed at people who serve the town twice. That is set
out in the section above, Who Chapter 2.50 covers; the drafting consequences are picked up in
Section 1.4.
And there's a second conflict-of-interest ordinance we should have in front of us. Chapter 2.50
points to it:
§ 2.50.110(B): "In the event any provision of this chapter... is contradictory to any provision of the
conflict of interest provisions of the Town of Waterford Code of Ordinances (Section 2.08.050), the
provisions of this chapter shall prevail.”
§ 2.08.050** — Conflict of interest.** "Any member or employee of any town board, agency or
commission, or any official, officer or employee of the town shall be prohibited from: A.
Participating in the decision of any town board, agency, commission or office relative to any
contract or._purchase order for supplies, materials, equipment or contractual services furnished to
or used by the town, board, agency, commission or office if that person is financially interested in,
or has any personal beneficial interest, either direct or indirect; B. Accepting or receiving,
directly or indirectly, from any person, firm or corporation to which any contract or purchase order
may be awarded by the town, by rebate, gifts or otherwise, any money, or anything of value
whatsoever, or any promise, obligation or contract for future regard or compensation; C. Violation
of the provisions of this section may be cause for disciplinary action, up to and including removal
from office, by the appointive authority."
So the Waterford Code already recognizes a “personal beneficial interest, either direct or.indirect" —
just in a different chapter, and only for contracts and purchase orders.
1.2 The gap
Subsections (A) and (B) take their structure from Connecticut General Statutes § 7-148h(b). But we
didn't simply copy the state minimum — we widened it in two respects.
The statute reaches “an elected official," and only that official's "spouse or dependent child.”
Chapter 2.50 applies the same test to “public officials or town employees" — picking up appointed
officials and every wage-earning town and board of education employee — and to "their immediate
family," which § 2.50.020(C) defines to include parents, parents-in-law, siblings, spouses of children,
and dependent relatives in the household.
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 8 of 30

We expanded who the conflict of interest test applies to, but we never broadened it beyond financial
interests. The test still asks one question — will this person, their immediate family, or a business
they're associated with gain or lose money directly — and it now asks that of every appointed official
and every wage-earning town and board of education employee. Four things follow from that.
(a) The test only reaches direct money. A conflict exists only if the official expects "a direct monetary
gain" or "a direct monetary loss." An interest that's real, substantial, and obvious to anyone watching
— but that isn’t a payment to the official — simply isn't in the definition. Chapter 2.50 has no concept
of a personal or non-financial interest.
We shouldn't overstate this, though. As Section 1.1 notes, § 2.08.050 already bars participating in a
decision where a person “is financially interested in, or has any personal beneficial interest, either
direct or indirect.” The Waterford Code isn't silent on personal interests — it's inconsistent about them,
and the two provisions sit in different places with different enforcement routes. Section 2.08.050
recognizes indirect and personal interests, but only for contracts and purchase orders, and it is
enforced by the appointing authority through discipline: a violation "may be cause for disciplinary
action, up to and including removal from.office, by the appointive authority." Chapter 2.50, which is the
chapter the Waterford Ethics Commission administers, recognizes neither kind of interest, for any
subject. That's an argument for harmonizing two provisions we already have, which is an easier thing
to ask for than a new idea.
(b) We say nothing about serving in two roles at once. Residents often serve the town twice — as
an employee and as an elected or appointed member of a town body — and Chapter 2.50 has no rule
for what that means. Employment creates interests that are real but not payments: an employer's
institutional stake in an outcome, and a relationship with the people who supervise, evaluate, and set
the pay of the member doing the voting. None of that is a "direct monetary gain." Our definitions
section names board of education employees and town employees, so we clearly contemplate that
these people serve — we just never say what happens when.a matter touches the body that employs
them.
This isn't a case of the chapter covering the ground. in different words. Tolland's rule names five
subjects: collective bargaining, compensation or benefits, personnel policies and procedures, the
budget and other appropriations, and the employment or performance of personnel. The words
"collective bargaining,” "budget," "appropriation," and "personnel policies" appear nowhere in Chapter
2.50. "Compensation" appears three times, none of them in the code of ethics itself, and "vote"
appears five times, all of them about how the Ethics Commission conducts its own business. The
nearest thing we have is the direct-monetary-gain test in § 2.50.030(A), and a vote on your own
department's appropriation is exactly the case that test was never built to catch.
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 9 of 30

(c) We have no rule for matters where the effect is indirect. Chapter 2.50 works well for the clean
case: a specific contract, a specific applicant, a specific decision with a traceable dollar consequence
for a named person. It gives us much less to work with when the matter is broad — an aggregate
appropriation, a policy adopted across a department, a decision whose effect on any one person is
real but diffuse. And the group exception in (B) is quietly doing a lot of work here. Read it broadly, "as
a member of a profession, occupation, or group" could excuse a great deal on the theory that
everyone in the group is affected alike. Read it narrowly, it only covers interests shared with the
general public. We don't say which way it should be interpreted, and there's no de minimis language
anywhere in the chapter to help us split the difference.
(d) There's no easy way to just put something on the record. Section 2.50.030(C) hangs entirely
on whether a "substantial conflict... exists" — a yes-or-no call the official has to make alone, in the
moment, with no obligation to say anything at all.if they land on "no." Nothing requires disclosing a
possible conflict and letting the minutes reflect it.
1.3 How.other Connecticut towns handle it
Essex — a low bar for disclosure, plus an actual definition of.a non-financial interest.
Source: Town of Essex Code of Ethics Ordinance, adopted at a Special Town Meeting on July 1, 2015
and published July 16, 2015
4
Definition, "Personal interest": "any interest, other than financial, which would affect the action
of the official or employee, except where that interest is based on the responsibility of his/her
town office or employment. Membership in or affiliation with a social, fraternal, charitable, service,
educational, religious, governmental or similar organization is not deemed to automatically
constitute a personal interest."
§ V.2: “Any person who may have an interest... shall disclose for the record of the proceedings
that the person has or may havea conflict of interest, prior to the decision, transaction or contract.
Disclosure of the nature of the conflict may, but need not, be disclosed for the record of the
proceedings."
§ V.4: "shall refrain from voting upon or otherwise participating in any matter... if he/she, ora
member of his/her immediate family, has a financial or personal interest in the decision"
The phrase to notice is "has or may have." That turns disclosure from a private judgment call into a
public default, and it moves the hard question off the individual official and onto the body — and, if it
comes to it, onto us. The sentence after it is worth just as much: Essex requires you to say that you
have a conflict without requiring you to say what it is. That's a ready answer to the privacy objection
anyone will raise against a mandatory disclosure rule.
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 10 of 30

But read the exception in the Essex definition carefully, because it cuts against us. A personal
interest doesn't count if it "is based on the responsibility of his/her town office or employment." Read
plainly, that carves out the very thing Section 1.2(b) is about — an interest arising from the individual's
own town employment. So Essex is a model for the disclosure trigger in § V.2, but not for the definition
of personal interest. The draft in Section 1.4 goes the other way and counts employment as a personal
interest.
Tolland — the only Connecticut provision | found that actually answers the employee-voting question.
Source: Town of Tolland Code of Ethics, Chapter 6
§ 6-3A (Recusal): "A Town employee or Town official shall refrain from voting upon or otherwise
participating in any matter on behalf of the Town if the employee or official, a business with which
he or she is associated, or a member.of his or her immediate family has a financial or personal
interest in the matter, including, but not limited to, the sale of real estate, material, supplies or
services to the Town or by the Town, Notwithstanding the foregoing prohibition, a Town employee
or Town official may vote or otherwise participate in a matter that involves a determination of
general policy if the employee's or official's interest in the matter is de minimus in nature or
shared with a substantial segment of the population of the Town, such as paying taxes,
assessments or charges for service to the Town.”
§ 6-3B: “In addition to other restrictions ofthis chapter, a Town employee who serves on any
governmental body of the Town shail not vote or participate.on any matter.involving, for the
department or program employing such public employee, (1) collective bargaining, (2)
compensation or benefits, (3) personnel policies and procedures, (4) the budget, other
appropriation or capital funding, or (5) employment, compensation, benefits or performance of
personnel."
§ 6-2, "Personal interest": "An interest in any action taken by the Town of Tolland in which an
individual will derive a nonfinancial benefit or detriment but which will result in the expenditure of
Town funds."
§ 6-2, "Conflict of interest”: "A condition wherein a public official or public employee or a
member of her/his immediate family has a financial or personal interest that conflicts with the
proper discharge of the public official's or public employee's official duties or employment in the
public interest or is contrary to this Code."
Tolland § 6-3B settles the dual-role question in advance instead of leaving it to be argued about after a
vote. And notice how the two pieces work together: § 6-3A's de minimis exception is deliberately
narrow — interests "shared with a substantial segment of the population of the Town, such as paying
Supplemental materia} provided by John Scimone, Page 11 of 30

taxes" — which shuts down the argument that a department-wide effect counts as a "group" interest
and is therefore excused.
One caution, and it's a real one: § 6-3B may not work in Tolland either. Their definitions section
says:
§ 6-2, "Town employee": "A person, other than an elected or appointed official, employed,
whether full- or part-time, by the Town."
/ § 6-2, "Town official’: “An elected or appointed official, whether paid or unpaid or full- or part-
time, of the Town."
So § 6-3B's subject — "a Town employee who serves on any governmental body of the Town" —
describes a person Tolland's own definitions exclude from the term "Town employee.” Tolland's chapter
is inconsistent on this in other places too: the definitions speak of “public official’ and “public
employee,” while the operative sections use "Town official" and "Town employee.”
None of that makes the underlying idea wrong. But Waterford's definitions carry the same exclusion,
so the sentence can't be borrowed as written — see Who Chapter 2.50 covers. The draft in Section
1.4 takes Tolland's substance and rewrites the subject.
Old Lyme — a fuller definition that names both financial and personal interests, and deals with outside
employment.
Source: Town of Old Lyme Code, Chapter 43, § 43-3
"A public official or public employee has an interest which is in substantial conflict with the proper
discharge of his/her duties or employment in the public interest if he/she has reason to believe
that he/she or a family member of his/hers will derive a direct monetary gain or suffer direct
monetary loss, as the case may be, by reason of his/her. official activity. A public official or public
_ 
employee does not have an interest which is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of
duties in the public interest if any benefit or detriment accrues to him/her as a member of a
business, profession, occupation or group to no greater extent than-any other member of such
business, profession, occupation or group. Specifically, a conflict of interest exists if a public
official or public employee or family member of such official or employee has a financial or
personal interest in the outcome of any matter under.consideration before him/her in his/her
official capacity within or before his/her department or a board or commission of which he/she is a
member; a public official or public employee accepts employment which will either impair his/her
independence or judgment with regard to his/her official duties or require him/her to disclose
confidential information acquired by him/her in the course of his/her duties.“
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 12 of 30

Old Lyme starts from exactly the same state-statute language we use, then adds a "Specifically..."
sentence that reaches financial or personal interests in the outcome. That's a pattern we could copy
without disturbing much of our existing text.
West Hartford — the widest version, for comparison.
Source: Town of West Hartford Cade, Chapter 16 — Ethics, Code of
§ 16-6: "No officer, official or employee of the Town shall engage in any business or transaction or
shall have a private financial interest or personal interest, direct or indirect, which is incompatible
or in conflict with the proper discharge of his or her official duties in the public interest or would
tend to impair the independence of judgment or action in the performance of the official duties of
the officer, official or employee of the Town.”
Brookfield — the most complete single provision of the group, and worth quoting in full.
Source: Town of Brookfield Code, Chapter 21
§ 21-4C (Deliberation and vote prohibited): "No officer/employee shall vote, act, participate in
official discussion or give official opinions on matters in which he has a direct or indirect financial
or other personal interest. Any officer/employee, who, as part of his official duties, comes upon a
circumstance where he may have a conflict, shall acknowledge publicly that a conflict exists. That
action shall be noted in the minutes of the meeting and the officer/employee shall recuse himself
from participation in that particular issue. The officer/employee does not have to disclose the
specific nature of this conflict or submit a disclosure form. If the conflict occurs during the public
session of a meeting, the officer/employee shall move away from the table and may sit in the
audience. If the conflict occurs in executive session, the officer/employee shall leave the meeting
during the executive session."
Brookfield does four things in one paragraph: a recusal rule that reaches "direct or indirect financial or
other personal interest"; a public acknowledgment requirement; a minutes requirement; and a
physical-separation requirement. It also tracks Essex in not requiring the official to explain the nature
of the conflict.
Montville and Plainfield — on what recusal actually requires you to do.
Montville § 49-4A disqualifies the member “to act in any way (including discussion) on the matter" —
though note it applies specifically to Town Council members, and only where there's “a monetary or
material benefit accruing in any proposed legislation before the Council". Plainfield § 1-3 {[ 3(b)
matches Brookfield's physical-separation rule: the official "shall recuse himself from such participation
and vacate the room where the business is being conducted during the time of the discussion, voting
or action” (rev. 3-31-2009).
Supplementat material provided by John Scimone, Page 13 of 30

All three are tighter than our § 2.50.030(C), which lets 
a member with a disclosed conflict stay in the
discussion and keep offering opinions and recommendations.
1.4 Suggested language
Draft text below is written in ordinance register on purpose — this is the part that has to be precise.
Two drafting points before the text. First, 
§ 2.50.030 already runs through subsection (H), so new
material is added as ({) through (L) rather than inserted after (B). (Objective 2 adds one further
subsection, (M), to the same section — see Section 2.4.) Second, subsection (K) names both defined
terms rather than picking one. Who Chapter 2.50 covers explains why: either term on its own leaves
somebody out. Naming both costs nothing and closes the gap in both directions.
(a) Add to § 2.50.020 (Definitions):
“Financial interest" means an interest, whether direct or indirect, from which an individual would
derive a monetary gain or suffer a monetary loss.
“Personal interest" means an interest, other than a financial interest, in any matter before the
town from which an individual would derive a non-financial benefit or detriment. A personal
interest includes, without limitation, an interest arising from the individual's employment by the
town or by the board of education, and an interest arising from a relationship with a person who
supervises, evaluates, appoints, promotes, disciplines, or sets or recommends the compensation
of the individual. 
:
"Conflict of interest" means an interest that is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of
_ 
duties within the meaning of Section 2.50.030(A), or a financial interest or personal interest within
_ 
the meaning of Section 2.50.030(I).
Why three definitions and not one. Chapter-2.50 currently has no definition of "conflict of interest"
and none of “financial interest" — subsections (A) through (C) work entirely through the phrase
“substantial conflict" and the test of “direct monetary gain." Once we add a personal-interest limb, the
chapter needs a single term that covers both limbs, or the recusal rule in (C) and the disclosure duty in
(L) end up pointing at two concepts with no name in common. Tolland and Old Lyme both define
"conflict of interest" for exactly this reason.
(b) Add a new subsection (I) to § 2.50.030, after existing subsection (H):
(Il) Personal interests. In addition to the substantial conflicts described in subsection (A) of this
section, a conflict of interest exists if a public official or fown employee, or a member of that
individual's immediate family, has a financial interest or a personal interest in the outcome of any
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 14 of 30

matter under consideration before the individual in the individual's official capacity. Subsections
(B) and (J) of this section apply to a conflict of interest under this subsection to the same extent
they apply to subsection (A).
(c} Add a de minimis and general policy exception:
(J) De minimis and general policy matters. Notwithstanding subsections (A) and (I) of this
section, a public official or town employee may vote or otherwise participate in a matter involving
a determination of general policy if the individual's interest in the matter is de minimis in nature or
is shared with a substantial segment of the population of the town, such as the payment of taxes,
assessments, or charges for services to the town.
(d) Add the employment rule — this is the piece that addresses the gap in 1.2(b):
(K) Service on a town body by town and board of education employees. in addition to the
other restrictions of this chapter, any public official or town employee who serves as a member of
any governmental body of the town and who is employed for salary or wages by the town or by
the board of education shall not vote or.participate on-any matter involving, for the department,
board, or program employing that individual: (1) collective bargaining; (2) compensation or
benefits; (3) personnel policies and procedures; (4) the budget, other appropriation, or capital
funding; or (5) the employment, compensation, benefits, or performance of personnel. Nothing in
this subsection prevents such an individual from voting on a budget or appropriation for the town
as a whole, provided the individual does not vote separately on the budget, appropriation, or
capital funding of the department, board, or. program employing the individual. This subsection
applies to such an individual whether.that individual is a public official, 
a town employee, or both,
and notwithstanding the exclusion of public officials from the definition of “town employee" in
Section 2.50.020.
(e) Add the disclosure trigger:
(L) Disclosure. Any public official or town employee who has, or may have, a conflict of interest
under this section shall disclose that fact on the record of the proceeding before any decision,
transaction, or contract is acted:upon, whether or not the individual concludes that the interest
requires recusal. Where the matter is not acted upon at a meeting of 
a town body, the disclosure
shall be made in writing to the commission and to the individual's appointing authority or
department head before the matter is acted upon. An individual who is prohibited from voting or
participating by subsection (K) of this section shall likewise disclose that fact before the matter is
acted upon. The individual is not required to disclose the nature or details of the interest.
Disclosure under this subsection does not, by itself, satisfy the recusal requirement of subsection
(C).
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 15 of 30

(f} And then there's the existing § 2.50.030(C), which would be amended in place:
Right now it says: "If the conflict is disclosed, a public official or town employee may participate in
discussions with or give opinions or recommendations to a town board, agency, commission,
committee, department, or another public official or town employee."
Whether that sentence should be kept is an open question. As written, it lets 
a member with an
acknowledged conflict stay in the room and argue a position — which is the exact thing Brookfield §
21-4C, Montville § 49-4A, and Plainfield § 1-3 {] 3(b) prohibit. There's also a question whether it's
enforceable at all as to elected officials; see Section 1.5. lf we'd rather tighten it:
(C) A public official or town employee may not take official action on any matter in which a conflict
under subsection (A) or (I) of this section exists, and shall not vote on, participate in the
discussion of, or give an opinion or recommendation concerning such matter, except in response
to a question from the body and after the disclosure required by subsection (L) has been made
and recorded.
1.5 Open questions
The bright-line rule is a genuine policy call. Suggested § 2.50.030(K) would prohibit votes that are
currently allowed, or at least arguably allowed. It lands on residents who serve the town twice — as
employees and as elected or appointed members. Some people will say it protects the integrity of the
vote; others will say it disenfranchises a group of residents and the voters who elected them. Both of
those are fair points. Our options, roughly:
« A bright line (Tolland § 6-3B) — predictable, settled in advance, no case-by-case judgment calls,
but categorical.
« Disclosure, with recusal only when someone finds a conflict (Essex, Brookfield) — flexible,
but it recreates the ambiguity we're trying to get rid of.
e Disclosure, participation still allowed — basically our current rule, just written down clearly
instead of left to inference.
To be clear about what the draft actually does: it isn't one of.those three. It takes the first and the
second together 
— a bright line in § 2.50.030(K) for the narrow list of matters touching one's own
employing department, and a general disclosure duty in § 2.50.030(L) for everything else, with recusal
under the amended § 2.50.030(C). The de minimis exception in § 2.50.030(J) is written to reach
subsections (A) and (I) but deliberately not (K), so the bright line stays absolute. If only one of the
three approaches is wanted, the pieces can be taken separately: (K) alone is the bright line, (L) with
(C) is disclosure-plus-recusal, and (L) without amending (C) is close to our current rule written down.
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 16 of 30

The definitions question sits behind this one. Who Chapter 2.50 covers sets out three routes for
dealing with the mutual exclusivity of "public official" and "town employee," and argues that the right
one is to strike "or any public official" from § 2.50.020(E) and repair the two provisions that would shift.
It bears on the draft below in a concrete way: subsection (K) names both defined terms because that
works whichever route is taken, and it could be written more simply if the exclusion went. Worth
settling early either way, because it changes the size of the amendment the R.T.M. would be asked to
pass.
Suggested questions for the Town Attorney.
1. Does the Waterford Charter say anything about town or Board of Education employees serving on
the RTM, or limit their participation in any vote? Anything we do has to fit the Charter, and the
Charter wins.
2. Is there a quorum or majority problem if. 
a chunk of 
a body ends up recused from the same matter,
and does the common-law rule of necessity apply? An ordinance that leaves a body unable to act
on business it has to act on would be a serious own goal. We may want a saving clause.
3. Separate from whatever our ordinance says, does Connecticut law already bearon when a
member of a municipal body must abstain because of an employment relationship with the town
or one of its agencies?
4. Does an ordinance provision about “town employees" reach Board of Education employees? Our
own § 2,50.020 definition expressly includes "board of education employees," so within Chapter
2.50 it looks like yes — but how that interacts with the Board's independent statutory authority is
worth a check.
5. Is the second sentence of § 2.50.030(C) already unenforceable as to elected officials? CGS
§ 7-148h(b) begins "Notwithstanding the provisions of any special act, municipal charter or.
ordinance to the contrary" and ends "Any such elected official who has a substantial conflict may
not take official action on the matter.” It contains no disclose-and-participate exception, and
neither.does its state-officer analogue, CGS § 1-85. Our § 2.50.030(C) then permits.a conflicted
official who discloses to "participate in discussions with or give opinions or recommendations." If
that proviso is preempted for elected officials, the amendment suggested in Section 1.4(f) isn't
only a policy improvement — it's a correction, and which it is should be settled before the
provision goes any further.
6. How should Chapter 2.50 and § 2.08.050 fit together? Section 2.50.110(B) already tells us
Chapter 2.50 prevails where the two conflict. If we broaden Chapter 2.50 to reach personal
interests generally, § 2.08.050's narrower contract-and-purchase-order rule becomes redundant at
best and confusing at worst. Worth asking whether the two should be harmonized in the same
round of amendments.
Supplemental material provided by John Scimone, Page 17 of 30

Objective 2 — Add an appearance-of-impropriety
standard
2.1 What Chapter 2.50 says now
The word "appearance" doesn't appear anywhere in Chapter 2.50. But we're closer to having this than
it looks, and the sentence we already have is the one to build on.
§ 2.50.010(A):
"Public office is a trust conferred by public authority for a public purpose. The trust of the public is
essential for government to function effectively. Public policy must be based on honest and fair
deliberations and decisions. Policy development must be free from.threats, undue influence,
and all forms of impropriety, so that the confidence of the public is not eroded, By enacting
this code of ethics, the Town of Waterford seeks to maintain and increase the confidence.of our
citizens in the integrity and fairness of their. government."
Now put that beside Old Lyme § 43-1A, quoted in full in Section 2.3:
"The process of policy formulation and decisionmaking must be free from threats, favoritism,
undue influence and even the appearance of impropriety so that the confidence of the public in
our Town government is maintained."
The framing differs at each end, but the m