Board of Selectmen - Minutes - 12/16/2025

FIFTEEN ROPE FERRY ROAD
PHONE: 860-442-0553
WATERFORD, CT 06385-2886
www. waterf rdeborg
MINUTES 
=
BOARD OF SELECTMEN REGULAR MEETING” 
‘
Tuesday, Deceniber 16, 2025
3:00 PM.
Waterford Town Hall (Auditorium)
eS:4 
Wd 
BF 230 
92
(Procedural Action: Check register to be signed by the Board of Selectmen in
accordance with CGS 7-83)
1. 
Call to Order & Roll Call: 5:02 PM
In Attendance: First Selectman, Robert Brule: Selectman, and Rich Muckle
Late: Selectman, Greg Attanasio (5:02 PM)
Pledge of Allegiance
Public Comment: Joshua Steele Kelly ~ re: Charter Revision Commission
(gave handout); Thomas Schacht — Water Supply Planning (email)
we
4, 
Public Works: ‘To consider and act on’a request from the Public Works
Director, Gary Schneider, for an additional appropriation of $10,027 to line
10130-31520 (Highway -Maintenance) - for. an employee payout ~and if
approved, forward to the BOF as required.
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
5.- 
Public Works: To consider and act ona request from the Public Works
Director, Gary Schneider, for an additional appropriation of $14,220 to line
10130-51530 (Refuse Collection) for an employee payout and if approved,
forward to the BOF as required.
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
6. 
Public Works: To consider and act on the following request for a FY26 In-
Series Transfer from Director of Public Works, Gary Schneider, in the amount
of $4,000 to cover the cost of street tree maintenance due to the tree truck still
being out for repair with a new arrival date of mid-J. ahuary.
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED

7.
Public Works: To consider and act on a recommendation from Purchasing
Agent, Shea Davy, on behalf of Director of Public Works, Gary Schneider, for
surplus disposal of six (6) — 8 cubic yard meta dumpsters (not listed on the
asset listing) and a 2012 Ford F-250, VIN #1FTBF2B68CEA59387, ASSET
#101133, FLEET ID H19, as these items have past their service life and been
replaced.
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
8.
Utilities Commission: To consider and act on a recommendation from Shea
Davy, Purchasing Agent, on behalf of the Director of Utilities, Jill Stevens, to
award the bid to Resilient Land and Water, LLC, to identify the Capital
requirements surrounding the potential renewal of the Waterford/New London
Interlocal Water Agreement in the amount of $110,000. Funds will be available
in line # 20531-57898 (Engineering Interlocal Water).
MOTION by Mucktle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
9.
MOTION by Muckle and seconded by Brule to move #14, Appointments &
Resignations, to #9 VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0
Appointments & Resignations:
9a. To consider and act on an interim, alternate appointment of Anne
Darling, (R) to the Zoning Board of Appeals, due to a vacancy until the next
town election (11/02/2027).
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
9b. Resignation by Debra Walters, (U) Member, from the Historic
Properties Commission.
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
10. Emergency Management — State Homeland Security Grant Program
Region 4 Memorandum Agreement: RESOLVED, that the Board of
Selectmen may enter into with and deliver to the State of Connecticut
Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, Division of
Emergency Management and Homeland Security any and all documents
which it deems to be necessary or appropriate; and FURTHER RESOLVED,
that Robert J. Brule, as First Selectman of the Town of Waterford, is authorized
and directed to execute and deliver any and all documents on behalf of the
Town of Waterford and to do and perform all acts and things which he/she
deems to be necessary or appropriate to carry out the terms of such documents,
including, but not limited to, executing and delivering all agreements and
documents contemplated by such documents.

MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
11. Fire Services: To consider and act on the following request for a FY26 Out-
of-Series Transfer from Director of Fire Services, Chris Haley, in the amount
of $4,019 to cover the cost of W-25 tire replacement, and forward on to the
Board of Finance if approved.
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
12. Fire Services: To consider and act on the following request for a FY26 Out-
of-Series Transfer from Director of Fire Services, Chris Haley, in the amount
of $6,000 to cover the cost of rear tire replacement on W-41 and W-36, per
DOT inspection, and forward on to the Board of Finance if approved.
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
13. Fire Services: To consider and act on a recommendation from Purchasing
Agent, Shea Davy, on behalf of Director of Fire Services, Chris Haley, for
surplus disposal of a Brush Truck Fire Pump and Tank Skid Unit, as these
items have outlived their usefulness to the department.
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
14. Fire Services: To consider and act on a recommendation from Purchasing
Agent, Shea Davy, on behalf of Director of Fire Services, Chris Haley, for
surplus 
disposal 
of several 
items 
including 
self-contained 
breathing
apparatuses, self-contained breathing regulators, rapid intervention pack,
submersible pumps, tools, lights, spreader, cutter and a ska~pak cylinder, as
these items have outlived their usefulness to the department.
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
15. New Business: 
Reval & Solar Legislation update from Paige Walton,
Assessor; Crystal Mall updates from Rob Brule and Charter Revision
discussion from Greg Attanasio
16. Old Business: NONE
17. Correspondence:
17a. The First Selectman has re-appointed Michael Buscetto, (U) to the
Economic Development Commission, to fill the term of 9/1/26-8/31/30 as
a member.
17b.US Treasury Report — Final Quarterly thru 12.31.25
17e. State of CT Additional Revalution email from Rob Brule

17d. Council of Government Letters of Support for Changes to Reval
Cycle email from Rob Brule
17e. Solar Legislation Letter — email from Rob Brule
18. Consent Agenda
18a. Tax Refund: To approve and act on repayment of tax refund in the
amount of $5,207.14
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
18b. Board of Selectmen Regular Meeting Minutes November 18, 2025
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED
19. Adjournment: 6:18 PM
MOTION by Muckle, seconded by Attanasio, VOTING IN FAVOR: 3-0 PASSED

Joshua Steele Kelly
6 Marlin Drive 
Resident 
E: joshuasteelekelly@gmail.com
Waterford, CT 06385 
Waterford, CT 
P: 860-912-7624
December 2, 2025
Board of Selecimen
Waterford Town Hall
15 Rope Ferry Road
Waterford, CT 06385
Dear Selectmen,
1am writing to request that the Board of Selectmen vote as soon as possible to form a
Charter Revision Commission as a means of launching a Charter revision process.
| make this request now because the 2025 municipal election here in Waterford was a
stark reminder that elections are decided in a partisan manner, but multiple elected
officials in Waterford deliver services on a non-partisan basis. This includes:
e 
The Town Clerk, who does not decide any facet of Town policy and does not
change the manner in which his services are rendered on a partisan basis;
e 
The Tax Collector, who also does not decide any facet of Town policy and does
not change the manner in which taxes are collected on a partisan basis; and
e 
The Treasurer, who does not decide any facet of Town policy and does not
change the manner in which he conducts his work in a partisan manner.
The roles listed above are not partisan in nature; why do we elect them in a partisan
manner?
On the contrary, the Town Clerk and Tax Collector are required by State law to hold
certifications, and the Town Treasurer is 
a technically-involved role. Our Town is better
served by the technical prowess, skill, and knowledge of the three individuals that
currently hold those roles; but the partisan election of someone unqualified for the
position could lead to delays, mistakes, and even lawsuits if those mistakes are large
enough. For the sake of the Town, these three positions should be hired on a
professional basis, not elected on a partisan basis.
The Charter currently identifies these positions as needing to be elected; as such,
changing these positions to make them hired rather than elected would require the
revision of the Town's Charter. According to Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 7-188,
the Board of Selectmen of a town with such a body is required to vote to authorize the
creation of a Charter Revision Commission. Thus, | implore you to act accordingly to
protect the professional nature of these roles in Waterford for ail time.
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While the Charter is being revised, there are multipte other prospective changes that |
believe the Charter Revision Commission should be empowered to explore and
consider. 
| hope that you will present the Commission with a charge that is broad to
allow them maximum flexibility in their considerations and deliberations. | have included
a list of possible changes for the Commission to consider as an attachment to this letter
{see Appendix A).
Respecitully submitted,
CKOA
Joshua Steele Kelly

Appendix A: Items for Possible Consideration by the 2026 Charter Revision Commission
2..1.5: The term “town office” is nebulous at best and should be clarified to say
“elected town office,” as other parts of the Charter seems to allow vacancies for
some appointed positions to be filled by the Representative Town Meeting.
2.1.7: Runoff elections are expensive. Other towns use a coin flip to reduce cost.
It would be ideal to future-proof this section to allow for ranked-choice voting to
allow for instant runoff calculations to occur.
3.1.4: We have an overabundance of members on the Representative Town
Meeting currently. Devising a way to proportionately assign a set number of
officials between the set vofing districts may be a way to ensure proportional
representation based on population size while avoiding the never-ending growth
of the RTM.
3.1.5 - 3.1.6: To allow for greater continuity on the Town's legislature, it may be
wise to move the election of these individuals to staggered four-year terms.
3.1.7: Here and in all other sections where it may occur, “Elector” needs to be
clearly defined. Is it a registered voter? If so, that fact must be articulated.
3.1.9a: The portion of this section regarding ballot access by petition is contrary
to state law; state law only requires 1% of the number of people who voted for a
given position in the last election to have to sign a petition to get a person on
the ballot for that petition. That number is generally jess than 100. As such, this
requirement should be struck from the Charter.
3.1.9a: The sentence reading “no signature on a petition shall be valid or
counted if the signer thereof shall have signed other petitions on file with the
town clerk for more than the number of candidates which a political party may
nominate under this charter for the district wherein such signer shail reside” is
both hard to track and is a limitation of the democratic process; there is no
direct benefit or rationale for this provision aside from making it harder for
residents to run for office. It should be eliminated.
3.1.9b: It is likely that this provision is already required by state law and should be
eliminated to avoid redundancy.
3.1.9: This provision is already required by state law and should be eliminated to
avoid redundancy.
3.1.9g: This provision allows people who may not have the support of a majority
of voters to win elections; it would be advisable from a democratic perspective
to future-proof this clause to allow for ranked-choice voting in the future.
3.1.10: This provision does not successfully account for individuals elected outside
of a recognized political party and does not provide any checks and balances
between the legislative and executive branches. | would recommend this be
amended to state that the three nominations shall be made by the First
Selectman and that the nominees must be from the same registered party
affiliation (including Unaffiliated) as the person who has vacated the seat.
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e 
3.1.11: All clauses in the Charter should be updated to future-proof the
document from changes to state law that would allow notices to be placed
online and not strictly in the newspaper.
e@ 
3.1.13: As 
a means of providing a greater check and balance on the legislature,
emergency legislation should only be able to be enacted when a Declaration of
Emergency Is issued by the Governor or municipal CEO.
e 
3.1.14a: 5% of the number of elected voters in town is roughly 700 people: that is
too many signatures for anyone to reasonably obtain in such a short time. 
|
recommend this number be reduced fo either 3% or 500 people.
e 
3.2.1: 
| believe a three-person Board of Selectmen is simply too small to be
effective for anything other than rubber-stamping the will of the First Selectmen, |
recommend that the Board of Selectmen be expanded to a seven-person body
with staggered elections.
e 
3.2.1: In the event changes are made to the CEO position, the last sentence in
this section may be changed to include “Chair of the Board of Selectmen."
e 
3.2.3: Conversion of the position of Chief Executive Officer from an elected role
to a hired role (Town Manager), given that the growing needs of the town and
the technical skills required of a municipal Chief Executive continue to rise to a
point of requiring a trained professional to manage the role; the hiring of a Chief
Executive also helps eliminate politics from fhe executive office. If this change is
made, such Executive Powers would generally lie with the Town Manager,
though the First Selectperson would continue to have powers of their own. In
order to achieve continuity, | believe the current First Selectperson would be best
suited to be automatically appointed as the first Town Manager with the first
Town Manager search commencing following that position becoming vacant.
3.2.4 - 3.2.5: If the CEO position is amended, these items require refinement.
e 
3.2.6b: there is a typo here, the first instance of the word “Board” should be
removed.
e 
3.3.1 - 3.3.4: 1 recommend that the Board of Finance be eliminated and that the
responsibility of the Board of Finance be transferred to the expanded Board of
Selectmen, especially if some of the responsibilities of the First Selectperson are
transferred to a Town Manager.
3.3.5: This item is not one that needs to be enumerated within a Town's Charter.
e 
3.4 - 3.6: Conversion of the positions of Town Clerk, Tax Collector, and Treasurer
from elected roles to hired roles, given these positions do not execute their
responsibilities in a partisan manner. To ensure continuity with the roles, | believe
the current holder of this position would be best suited to be automatically hired
to this role with the first search commencing following that position becoming
vacant.
3.7, 3.9: Are these stipulations relevant given that state law articulates it well?
3.10 - 3.11: The Board of Assessment Appeals and the Zoning Board of Appeals
are both best handled by qualified individuais; as such, it may be best to convert
these from an elected to an appointed position.
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e 
Chapter 4: Would it be better to convert some of these items to ordinance so
they are more easily amended as needed?
e 
5.3: 
| know from first-hand experience that the Inland Wetlands & Conservation
Commission rarely have time to talk about conservation because they spend so
much time talking about Inland Wetlands. | recommend that the Conservation
Commission and Iniand Wetlands Commission be separated, and that the
Conservation Commission then be combined with the Recreation & Parks
Commission.
e 
5.7 - 5.9: These items should be appointed at the discretion of the municipal CEO
and should not strictly be enumerated in the Charter,
e 
5.13: Can this Board be combined with the Zoning Board of Appeals or another
agency?
5.14: Should this provision be listed in the Town Charter?
5.19 - 5.20: These ifems should be appointed at the discretion of the municipal
CEO and should not strictly be enumerated in the Charter.
e 
Additional Item: should the Charter revision process be enumerated in this
document, and should Charter revision process be required to occur no less than
every 10 years at minimum?
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Shannon Withey
From: 
Thomas Schacht <thomasschacht@hotmail.com>
Sent: 
Tuesday, December 16, 2025 10:33 AM
To: 
First Selectman
Cc: 
Town Clerk
Subject: 
Public comment for December 16, 2025 Board of Selectmen meeting
Attachments: 
Waterford Water Supply Planning - public comments to Selectmen .pdf
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CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.
Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the |
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Please accept the attached document as for-the-record public comment on the water supply planning item on
the December 16, 2025 Board of Selectmen's agenda.
Thank you.
Thomas Schacht

TO: 
Waterford Board of Selectmen.
By e-mail.
FROM: 
Thomas Schacht
thomasschacht@hotmail.com
423-742-0305
RE: 
Public comment - water planning agenda item - December 16, 2025 Board of
Selectmen meeting
DATE: 
December 15, 2025
Please accept this memo as for-the-record public commentary on the pending expiration of the
interlocal water agreement and the Town’s process of engaging consultants to help plan for the
future.
[1] Waterford should stop planning in secret and embrace public transparency.
Utility Commission minutes dated December 12, 2023 show that the Commission on that date
authorized establishment of a committee to work on water supply planning. Here is the item from
the minutes:
Commissioner Valentini requested that the Commission create a Water Task
Force sub-committee to evaluate the Town’s water supply, demands and
operations for the next 50 years and beyond. Chairman Kirkman tasked Mr.
Bartelli to work with Commissioner Valentini to establish members of the
proposed Task Force Committee and provide more information for consideration
at the next regular meeting.
Subsequent Commission minutes refer to the water planning committee by slightly different
names. On January 9, 2024 it was called “Water Task Force Subcommittee.” At the next meeting
on February 13, 2024 it was called “Ad Hoc Water Committee.” The Committee had its first
meeting in October 2024.
C.G.S. § 1-200(1) specifically includes committees and subcommittees in the definition of a
“public agency” subject to FOIA and C.G.S. § 1-200(2) makes clear that meetings of committees
and subcommittees of public agencies are “meetings” subject to FOIA’s open-meeting rules.
Pursuant to FOJA, in December 2023 I made a request for agendas and minutes of the water
planning committee. The request was denied on the basis of a claim that the committee meetings
were not meetings of a public agency under FOIA. Really? Read the statute.
Page | of 10

The Town attorney justified the FOIA denial with a citation to a questionably applicable state
Supreme Court Case (Meriden y Freedom of Information Commission, 2021). That case held
meetings of an informal “leadership group” of city officials, not formed pursuant to any official
act of the City Council, were not “meetings” under FOIA. In contrast, the Waterford Utility
Commission’s water planning committee was not an informal group or routine office staff
meeting. The water planning committee was formed pursuant to an official action of the Utility
Commission. It was authorized to investigate specific questions of vital importance to the Town
and potentially to the region. It is expected to make reports and recommendations and it appears
as a routine agenda item for the Utility Commission and is routinely referenced in Commission
minutes. Yet - it is claimed - details of the water planning committee’s work are not public
information.
Is this the kind of government that the people of Waterford deserve or voted for? Access to a
pure and adequate supply of water is everybody’s business. Water is a public trust. The last time
Waterford negotiated a water contract with New London, it took eight contentious years. At one
point the handling of a water issue prompted an editorial by The Day that used the words “nasty,”
“pigheaded” and “retaliatory” to describe behavior of officials.’ If the current water planning
situation is being handled in the public interest with appropriate skill and integrity, what is there
to hide?
[2] There is an elevated risk of stumbling into another bad deal if the Town does not
organize its own house.
The Town has been derelict in its oversight of the current interlocal contract. Uncorrected, this
does not bode well for the future. For example:
. 
The Town has failed to require that New London provide water system financial
information as required by the terms of the existing contract. Waterford’s former Utility
Commission director told me the Commission has no idea if New London’s rate-setting
has complied with the contract formula because the Town doesn’t track that topic.
* 
Waterford has paid no attention to the fact that for multiple consecutive years, New
London’s municipal auditors have reported “material” findings regarding deficiencies in
the City’s water department accounting — including findings that the system has been
vulnerable to fraud. No regulated private utility could get away with this type of financial
mismanagement.
. 
Waterford did not figure out that New London had for years been diverting water-related
revenues to its general fund and elsewhere, contrary to statutory requirements for water
' “Stop fighting. Leadership, not acrimony, needed in City-Town dispute.” The Day, April
20, 1983, p. 10.
Page 2 of 10

monies to be used for the water system and no other purpose. This diversion occurs at
Waterford’s expense.
. 
Waterford didn’t bother to obtain a copy of New London’s operations and management
contract with private vendor Veolia - even though Veolia provides services in Waterford
and, per its contract with New London, Veolia is responsible for upholding New
London’s obligations under the interlocal contract.
. 
Per Utility Commission minutes of March 17, 2015, the Town’s own engineer mis-
informed the commission about the status of existing water supply studies, incorrectly
reporting that there were no studies on a particular topic when in fact there had been
multiple in depth studies, many of which had been funded by the Town.
The proposal before the Board of Selectmen is to hire an engineering firm to assist with planning.
Engineers are necessary, but they have limits. In the last contract negotiation, Waterford was out-
lawyered, not out-engineered.
{3] The current interlocal contract is economically unjust, inequitable, probably unlawful,
and demonstrably vulnerable to corruption. One or both of the following alternatives
should be chosen going forward:
[a] 
The Town should take control of its retail water utility operation. This
involves operating as a self-supplier via purchasing water at wholesale
and/or developing Town-owned supplies. As a corollary to controlling its
retail utility operation, the Town should control the selection and contracting
process if a private company is to operate and manage the Town’s water
system.
{b] 
The Town should fulfill the unkept promise made 37 years ago in the current
water contract and become part of a regional water system.
Control of Retail Water Utility Operation
Since entering the first interlocal water contract with New London in 1968, Waterford’s water
system has operated under the weight of unjust and probably unlawful bullying from New
London. In the past this was most plainly evident in the multiple occasions in which the City
abused its control of water by declaring moratoriums on new water connections in the Town 
—
effectively shutting down new economic development until the City got what it wanted. But
moratoriums and other threats do not capture the full extent of New London’s economic
oppression tactics.
For more than a half-century, the confiscatory terms of the interlocal arrangement have prevented
Waterford from generating any meaningful revenue from water utility sales and services. Instead,
Page 3 of 10

the Town has been forced to rely on non-utility sources of money to support the utility, such as
general tax revenues.
This is not how municipal utilities are supposed to operate. State law directs that municipal
utility services will be funded by user fees. Every time Waterford makes a general fund
appropriation for the water utility, the Town unfairly shifts utility costs onto taxpayers who
cannot benefit from the water system because their property lies in areas served by wells. Every
property in Waterford that is served by a private well pays both for that well and, through general
taxes, for a water system that is inaccessible to the property owner. J am a Waterford taxpayer
affected by this unfair arrangement. Although the law permits a Town to use its general fund
when utility revenues are insufficient, the situation in Waterford turns that extraordinary backup
provision into a perpetual state of affairs.
When negotiating the present water contract, New London insisted it deserved a “return on
investment” in its water system. That’s reasonable so long as the return is not excessive. Yet,
New London has denied Waterford access to the same economic benefit from the Town’s
investment of tens of millions of dollars in water infrastructure. By insisting on contract terms
that deprive Waterford of the ability to earn revenue from water services in the Town, New
London has effectively annexed Waterford’s water infrastructure for the exclusive economic
benefit of the City.
All of this would change for the better if the Town adhered to the recommendations of its own
water supply planning ordinance number 13.04.020. That ordinance contemplates the Town
purchasing water at wholesale to supply its own customers at rates set by the Town. Here is the
ordinance text:
Water supply studies to consider 1958 report. Studies concerning supply of
water shall consider the several schemes outlined in the water supply survey
report by Philip W. Genovese and Associates submitted August 28, 1958,
particularly the investigation of subsurface water supply for initial local area
systems and the purchase by the town of metered water for service to present
mains and extensions thereto. (italic emphasis added)
Purchase of metered water means wholesale purchase by the Town’s water utility for resale to the
Town’s retail water customers. See: “Waterford’s Water Survey Summarized: Bulk Purchase
From City Recommended.” The Day, 10-22-1958, p. 20.
In negotiations for the first interlocal water contract in 1968, New London refused to sell water to
the Town at wholesale. Instead, the City insisted that it would only provide water if the City also
controlled the retail service delivery in the Town and if the City set water rates in the Town. The
City’s demand was unjust, inequitable, and/or unlawful on multiple grounds.
Page 4 of 10

First, in making its demands for total control, New London unjustly exploited the coercive
circumstances of a water supply crisis. Waterford was simultaneously growing rapidly and
reeling from a multi-year drought that took place in the mid-1960's. Wells had dried up all over
the town. Some people were forced to carry water to their homes in buckets filled from distant
fire hydrants.
Second, by agreeing to New London’s demands for total control, Waterford unlawfully delegated
a non-delegable legislative rate-setting duty of its RTM to the New London City Council. The
New London City Council is barely accountable to New London voters. It is not accountable at
all to Waterford voters.
The RTM’s rate-setting duty is set forth at CGS § 7-239(a). This statute, specifically applicable
to municipal water utilities, prescribes that:
“(a) The legislative body shall establish ... rates or charges for the use of the
waterworks system.”
Because Waterford does not set its own water rates, the Town’s water customers have no
authority accountable to them capable of assuring that their water service complies with the
additional statutory requirements that:
. 
Rates be “just and equitable”
° 
Rates be “sufficient in each year for the payment of the expense of operation, repair,
replacements and maintenance of such system”
. 
Rates be “sufficient in each year ... for the payment of the sums in this subsection
required to be paid into the sinking fund.”
. 
“Tn establishing such rates or charges, the legislative body shall consider measures that
promote water conservation and reduce the demand on the state's water and energy
tesources.”
Third, as a condition of doing business with Waterford, New London also has coercively required
that Waterford refrain from independently obtaining water from any other source — including
even the Town’s own sources should it develop any. The interlocal contract contains a theoretical
exception if there is a shortage, but this exception has proven worthless because New London
retains exclusive control over the definition of shortage (which is not spelled out in the contract)
and because New London has a history of lying to the Town and to State authorities about the
adequacy of its water supplies to avoid acknowledging shortage. This is not an exaggeration -
New London’s history of repeated manipulation of its water supply numbers is a matter of public
record and state agencies have in the past confronted the City about its inaccurate numbers. Town
historian Robert Bachman recites one notorious episode involving New London’s attempt to
Page 5 of 10

leverage its control of water to block construction of the Crystal Mall - see page 92 of the 2000
Bicentennial Town History.
The importance of additional water supply is highlighted by the fact that during the multi-year
drought that preceded the 1968 water agreement, New London’s reservoir system plummeted to
18% of capacity. This critical low was reached before the City took on the burden of supplying
an entire additional municipality. The severity of the drought’s impact on New London’s water
supply is recited by the Connecticut Supreme Court in its 1968 decision in Dimmock vy New
London (a case in which the court told New London that it could not steal water from someone
else’s land but had to pay for it).
At the time of the 1968 contract, New London admitted that serving Waterford safely would
require additional supply and the City represented that it would develop that supply. After
signing the 1968 contract, the City revived a water plan that had been originally developed in the
early 1950's when a steel mill was proposed for Millstone Point. The plan was to construct a
huge dam and flood the Hunts Brook valley to create a giant reservoir that would feed into Lake
Konomoc. But the City never carried out that plan and under current environmental laws it would
be virtually impossible.
At the time of signing the present water supply agreement in 1988, New London had still not
added any new sources of supply. Within months of signing the 1988 contract, New London
experienced a water supply crisis and announced water use restrictions with violators subject to
arrest.
Here we are, now 57 years after the 1968 contract and New London has still not added any
additional regular sources of supply. Only under pressure of consent orders from the state has
New London tweaked the operational efficiency of its system with a new intake pipe at Lake
Konomoc and participation in a regional emergency interconnection. Beyond those measures,
which are designated for emergencies - not economic growth - the City has made Waterfotrd an
involuntary player in a game of drought roulette, flirting with operation below the DPH
recommended margin of safety and failing to fulfill a water system’s responsibility to make
available an abundant supply of water.
New London has boasted of low water rates and Waterford officials have sometimes rationalized
the shortcomings of the interlocal contract on these grounds. Based on what is said, one would
think that New London is possesses some economic wizardry.
In truth, there is no free lunch. But there is temporary free-riding. The Town has been coasting on
the economic coat-tails of the fact that its water infrastructure is comparatively new - much of it
built in the 1960's — and has not yet reached the end of its useful service life. However, coasting
is unsustainable in the long-term. Future infrastructure replacement and perhaps expansion are
inevitable. However, because the current contract imprudently deprives Waterford of any water
revenues, the Town has had no money to build a sinking fund for water infrastructure
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replacement. Today’s water rate arrangement is imprudent and immorally robs our children, who
will end up burdened by the shortsightedness of previous generations.
In some respects, New London’s low water rates have historically suggested reckless under-
investment or plain incompetence. For example, on May 1, 2010 New London signed an
amendment to its operations and maintenance contract with Veolia that was made to avoid
litigation. In the contract amendment, the City admitted that the water distribution system to be
served under the contract was 75% larger than had been stated in the original bid and contract
documents. Seventy-five percent.
A New London official’s public statement that rates are “artificially” low also should make
Waterford uneasy.’ Artificially low rates have been political candy that has led Waterford to
self-destructively surrender to a contract scheme that turns the Town’s water system into a New
London asset. In 2006 the New London City Council recommended selling the water system.
That was not the first time that idea has been floated. In 2018 a City legislator introduced a bill
that would have allowed sale of the New London water system to a private company at full
market value, with the price recoverable in water rates. The bill passed out of committee with an
overwhelmingly favorable vote. Such a sale could be a huge windfall to New London,
substantially paid-for by Waterford rate-payers who would get nothing in return. The City’s
artificially low rates leave plenty of room for a new operator to increase rates to cover whatever
Price it paid to the City.
Under antitrust law, New London’s refusal to sell water at wholesale and its insistence on
controlling retail service and water rates in the Town constitutes a prohibited tying arrangement.
A tying arrangement is a situation in which a seller conditions the sale of one product or service
(the tying product) on the buyer’s agreement to purchase a second, distinct product or service (the
tied product) that the buyer may not want or would prefer to buy elsewhere.
In the case of Waterford and New London, the tying product is water and the tied service is retail
operation and maintenance of a water system.
The economic harm to Waterford is obvious and could hardly be more severe. New London’s
insistence on the tying arrangement is the foundation for New London’s free use of Town-owned
water infrastructure to provide retail water service. It is absurd that virtually 100% of revenue
generated from use of Town water infrastructure goes to the City. It is absurd that Waterford
receives zero return on its infrastructure investment - not even a penny for a sinking fund. Had
New London paid for its profitable use of the Town’s infrastructure, water rates would have been
necessarily higher but the Town would not be in its present untenable situation of zero water
revenue and no sinking fund for the Town’s future.
? See: “NL Plans To Sell Watershed Property” The Day, February 7, 2006, p. 11, quoting
the City Manager’s misleading virtue-signaling claim that the City’s water rates are a deliberate
“undervaluing of an asset of the City of New London in order to support the region.”
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It is instructive to compare the present situation to how Waterford an analogous situation in the
early 1980's. Without permission or compensation to the Town, New London had appropriated
use of Waterford’s water infrastructure to sell water to Montville. As a matter of principle,
Waterford asserted its property rights and said New London should have Waterford’s permission
to use Waterford’s assets. New London claimed it did not need Waterford’s permission. To
protect the Town’s rights, Waterford took New London to court. The case was settled against
New London, with a vindication of the Town’s property rights and a payment by New London.
The payment was only $13 - clearly what mattered to the Town were fundamental rights,
principles, and self-determination.
If the Town regains sufficient municipal courage to again vigorously defend itself against
economic bullying, then it may be useful to remember that New London is not immune from
consequences of violating antitrust laws when its water utility operates in other towns that are not
part of the City’s own state-sanctioned Exclusive Service Area. See: Millers Pond Company LLC
et al. v City of New London et al., 273 Conn. 786 (Conn. Supreme Court, 2005).
Control of Operations and Maintenance Contracting
In 1996, over some vigorous objections and without Waterford’s permission, New London
moved its water system operations and maintenance activities behind a financial curtain. The
City unilaterally outsourced these functions to a series of private contractors. Waterford was
completely excluded from the decision to privatize and was excluded from the contracting
process, which was conducted in secret by the City. The privatization completely upended the
rate-setting formula that had been negotiated in the contract signed eight years earlier.
Since 1996, New London has corruptly milked its private utility operations contracts for
mandatory kickbacks. The scheme originated behind the curtain of a phony charitable foundation
that the New London Water Authority had no power to create. Since 1996, millions of dollars
that should have benefitted ratepayers in the form of contract savings have instead been diverted
into private New London organizations, to City agencies unrelated to the utility system, and to
the City’s general fund. This ongoing financial diversion violates statutory requirements that
municipal utility-related revenue be used for the utility only and for no other purpose.
Nearly 18 months ago I supplied extensive documentation of this corrupt scheme to the
Waterford Utility Commission. To my knowledge, there has been no public discussion since
then. The citizens of Waterford are owed an explanation for the silence.
In 2006, for unstated reasons, Waterford and New London amended their water agreement to
make the contract assignable to third parties. This is economically risky for the Town. With an
assignable contract, and with the existing kickback scheme as a tested model, the City could just
function as a utility landlord, leasing its entire system to a private operator, and assigning the
contract to that operator in exchange for payments back to the City. The Town would have no say
in such a deal, but the Town’s water customers would end up paying a big chunk of the rent.
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Because municipal utilities are not PARA regulated, the amount of Waterford-subsidized rent
that New London could collect from a private water system operator would be limited only by the
City’s conscience. History does not support confidence in a view of New London as a
conscience-driven municipality.
In any new water agreement, Waterford should insist on complete financial transparency. Any
new agreement should also prohibit any scherne that diverts utility-related funds to non-utility
uses,
If Waterford is going to rely upon private contractors for operations and maintenance services,
the Town should contract directly for those services. If there is going to be a joint contract, then
the Town should be a full party in negotiating and letting any such contract.
Participation in A Regional System Should Be A Priority
The virtues of a regionalized approach to utility service are indisputable. Regionalization is
favored in state water policy. Large scale water utility regionalization has been highly successful
in other areas of the state - but not yet in Southeastern Connecticut. When the present Waterford-
New London water contract was signed in 1988, statements by officials indicated that it would
only be in place for a handful of years, until negotiations for a regional system promised in the
contract were consummated,
When Waterford initially proposed a regional system during negotiation of the present interlocal
contract, New London categorically rejected the idea. In official policy documents, the City
anointed itself “the area’s [sole] water entrepreneur.” New London policy emphasized that
Waterford was not a seller or supplier of water to anybody and affirmed a categorical “no
partners” policy with respect to water.
New London has a long and repeated history of not making necessary improvements to its water
system until: [a] there is an emergency; [b] it is compelled to do so by state or federal regulatory
authorities, and/or [b] the City has found a way to make somebody else pay for whatever needs to
be done. For the duration of the interlocal water contracts, Waterford has been the downstream
victim of New London water department lassitude. A regional system could go a long way
toward preventing this history from continuing to repeat itself.
Case in point: New London failed for more than a decade to comply with state and federal
orders to install a water treatment plant because the City’s water was determined to contain
excessive amounts of chemicals suspected to be cancer-causing. The City denied
responsibility for its deliberate failure to build the treatment plant. Instead, New London
blamed Waterford for the ongoing exposure of all of its water customers to water deemed
substandard by state and federal officials. When authorities finally reached the limit of their
patience, and told the City that no more excuses of any kind would be tolerated, New
London still didn’t build the treatment plant. Instead, New London imposed a draconian
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moratorium on all new water connections in the Town, effectively taking control of all new
construction and related economic development in the Town. The purpose of the
moratorium was simple: to extort the Town into signing an undesirable contract that was
economically exploitive of the Town. Ultimately, as a carrot counterbalancing the stick of
the moratorium, New London agreed to a contract provision promising to negotiate “in good
faith” toward creation of a regional water and/or sewer system.
That carrot was fake. On the topic of a regional water system, New London has shown it
does not understand the meaning of “good faith.” In hindsight, the City’s still unkept
promise to negotiate in good faith toward a regional water system simply functioned as a
bait-and-switch to get Waterford to sign the deal.
In 37 years, New London has not only failed to keep the regionalization promise with
respect to water, it has actively and unethically undermined that promise. Two specific
examples:
° 
The City flatly rejected an invitation to put regionalization on the agenda for a water
supply meeting because a Waterford RTM official had been invited. I know this
because I invited the Waterford official and was told by New London that the
meeting would be cancelled if the official attended,
. 
The City overtly opposed development of a regionally significant water resource by
SCWA. That resource and SCWA’s plan for it had been endorsed by the state
Department of Public Health and would have been a key step toward keeping the
regionalization promise in the interlocal agreement,
Water is a public trust. A municipal water utility is a fiduciary steward of that public trust.
Unfortunately, New London’s history shows that the City has self-servingly abused its water
stewardship. New London’s official water policy treats water as an opportunity for
exploitive entrepreneurship, not trusteeship. Keeping the promise of a regional system
would limit or prevent repetition and continuation of the City’s institutional betrayal of the
region.
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